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Foreword 
Several major DOD and NASA programs are seeking ways to reduce the costs of 
launching spacecraft. However, it typically costs much, much more to build a spacecraft than 
to launch it into a low orbit. Therefore, unless the costs of building spacecraft are reduced, even 
dramatic reductions in costs of launching to low orbit would reduce total spacecraft program 
costs by only a few percent. 
This background paper examines several proposals for reducing the costs of spacecraft 
and other payloads and describes launch systems for implementing them. It is one of a series 
of products of a broad assessment of space transportation technologies undertaken by OTA 
at the request of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the 
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. In 1988, OTA published the special 
report Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide and the technical memorandum 
Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices. In 1989, OTA 
published the background paper Big, Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost Space Transportation 
Option? and the special report Round Trip to Orbit: Human Spaceflight Alternatives. A 
summary report on space transportation, entitled Access to Space to be published in the spring 
of 1990, will be the final report in the space transportation series. 
In undertaking this effort, OTA sought the contributions of a wide spectrum of 
knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided information; others reviewed 
drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their contributions of time and intellectual effort. OTA 
also appreciates the cooperation and assistance of the Air Force and NASA. However, OTA 
is solely responsible for the content of this background paper and the other OTA publications. 
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Several major efforts are aimed at finding 
ways to reduce the cost of launching spacecraft. 
However, it typically costs much, much more to 
build a spacecraft than to launch it to low Earth 
orbit (LEO). Unless spacecraft costs are re-
duced, even dramatic reductions in launch costs 
will have only a small effect on total spacecraft 
program costs. 
This Background Paper reviews four possible 
approaches to spacecraft design that have been 
proposed to reduce total spacecraft program 
costs. Adopting them could change the launch 
rates, payload capacity, and reliability demanded 
of conventional launch vehicles, or create a 
demand for exotic launch systems to launch very 
small spacecraft cheaply. Conversely, develop-
ing new, economical launch systems would 
strengthen incentives to adopt these new ap-
proaches to spacecraft design. 
This is one of several publications document-
ing OTA' s broad assessment of space transporta-
tion technologies requested by the House Com-
mittee on Science, Space, and Technology, and 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation. Previous publications in 
this assessment examined a variety of future 
launch options,1 ways to reduce the costs of 
launch operations,2 low-cost, low-technology 
("big, dumb") boosters,3 and options for trans-
porting humans to and from orbit. 4 A final report 
will be published in 1990. 
Chapter 1 
Summary 
THE HIGH COST OF 
SPACECRAFT 
Because of the high cost of spacecraft, a 
dramatic reduction in launch cost alone will 
not substantially lower spacecraft program 
costs. Although launching a pound of payload to 
LEO currently costs about $3,000, procuring 
that pound of payload typically costs much 
more. For example, representative U.S. space-
craft busses5 of types first launched between 
1963 and 1978 cost between $130,000 and 
$520,000 per pound dry,6 including amortized 
program overhead costs. Procurement of the 
mission payloads carried on those busses cost 
about 50 percent more-about $200,000 to 
$800,000 per pound.7 Reducing launch costs 
from $3,000 to $300 per pound of payload, a 
goal of the Advanced Launch System program,8 
would reduce the total cost of procuring and 
launching a dry spacecraft (half bus, half 
mission payload) by less than 2 percent. 
A spacecraft bound for a high orbit or another 
planet requires an upper stage, which when 
fueled is typically more than twice as heavy as 
the spacecraft but costs less. Even so, a payload 
consisting of a Centaur upper stage (about 
$2,250 per pound) and a spacecraft weighing a 
third as much (half bus, half mission payload) 
might cost from $40,000 to $160,000 per pound. 
Reducing launch costs to $300 per pound would 
1U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide. OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 1988). 
2U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-ISC-28 
(Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. September 1988). 
3U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Big, Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost Space Transportation Option? (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. International Security and Commerce Program. February 1989). 
4U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Round Trip to Orbit: Human Spaceflight Alternatives. OTA-ISC-419 (Washington. DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. August 1989). 
5The "bus" of a spacecraft consists of the structure. power sources. and other subsystems required to support the mission payloads it carries. 
6Unfueled. 
7Space Systems and Operations Cost Reduction and Cost Credibility Workshop, Executive Summary (Washington. DC: National Security 
Industrial Association. 1987). p. 3-10. fig. 3.7.3. These estimates were derived by amortizing nonrecurring costs (e.g., for development) over four 
satellites; some programs procure more than four while others procure only one. OTA inflated the estimated costs. which were in 1982 dollars. to 
1987 dollars using the GNP inflator from table B-3 of the Economic Report a/the President. January 1989. and then to 1989 dollars by assuming 4.2 
percent annual inflation in 1987 and 1988. 
8101 Stat. 1067. 
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reduce the total cost of procuring and launching 
such a payload by only 2 to 6 percent. 
APPROACHES TO REDUCING 
PAYLOAD COSTS 
To reduce payload costs, and for other 
reasons, novel approaches to payload design and 
fabrication have been proposed: 
• Design payloads to fit launch vehicles 
leaving size and weight margins of about 
15 percent 
• Allow payloads to be larger and heavier: 
Fatsats 
• Allow satellites to be simpler, and make 
them lighter: Lightsats 
• Design Microspacecraft to be launched like 
artillery shells 
Each type of spacecraft-fatsat, lightsat, or 
microspacecraft-would impose unique launch 
demands. New, large launch vehicles would be 
needed to launch the heaviest satellites. 
Lightsats could be launched on existing launch 
vehicles, but new, smaller launch vehicles might 
launch them more economically. In wartime, 
small launch vehicles could be transported or 
launched by trucks or aircraft to provide a 
survivable means of space launch. Microspace-
craft could be launched on existing launch 
vehicles, but they might instead be launched by 
more exotic means such as a ram cannon, 
railgun, coilgun, or laser-powered rocket. Some 
of these might be proven feasible in the next 
decade. 
Weight margin: Designing payloads to fit 
launch vehicles while reserving am pie size 
and weight margins can reduce the risk of 
incurring delay and expense after assembly 
has begun. 
It is often the case that satellites grow 
substantially heavier than expected as they 
proceed from design to construction. For ex-
ample, dry weights of military spacecraft have 
been about 25 percent greater, on the average, 
than initially predicted. Growth in estimated 
weight may be caused by underestimating the 
weight of a spacecraft (especially one designed 
to use the most advanced technology) or by 
changing mission requirements during develop-
ment (requiring hardware to be added). If a 
payload grows so heavy during assembly that it 
threatens to "gross out" its assigned launch 
vehicle (i.e., cause its weight to equal or exceed 
the maximum allowable gross lift-off weight), 
the payload must be redesigned to cut its weight. 
This causes delay and increases cost. 
To reduce the risk of exceeding vehicle 
payload capacity, program managers could re-
quire designers to design each payload to fit its 
assigned launch vehicle with room to spare and 
to weigh substantially less than the maximum 
weight the vehicle can launch to orbit. However, 
this design philosophy would lead to more 
stringent size and weight constraints than would 
otherwise be imposed. If a mission simply could 
not be performed by payloads predicted to be 
small enough to fit the largest launch vehicles 
with adequate size and weight margins, new, 
larger launch vehicles would have to be devel-
oped to provide the desired margin. In many 
cases, however, sufficient margin could be 
provided by clever design, e.g., by designing 
several smaller single-mission payloads instead 
of a single multimission payload, or developing 
and using an electric-powered or space-based 
orbital transfer vehicle (OTV) instead of a 
conventional OTV.9 
Fatsats: If payloads were allowed to be 
heavier for the same capability, some could 
cost substantially less. For example, OTA 
estimates that Titan-class payloads that cost 
several hundred million dollars might cost 
about $130 million less if allowed to be five 
times as heavy. 
9'Jb place a satellite in a high orbit. a launch vehicle must carry both the satellite and either an upper stage to take the satellite directly to the high 
orbit. or an oTV to take the satellite from a low-altitude parking orbit to the high orbit. A conventional OTV weighs two or three times as much as the 
satellite it carries. An electric"powered OTV could weigh less than a conventional OTV of comparable capability. creating more weight margin. A 
space-based OTV could be launched separately from its payload. allowing the payload to weigh as much as its launch vehicle could carry while reserving 
the desired weight margin. However. operation of space-based OTVs would be complex and require costly infrastructure. 
If payloads were allowed to be much heavier, 
a manufacturer could forego expensive proc-
esses for removing nonessential structural mate-
rial, as well as expensive analyses and tests for 
assuring the adequacy of the remaining struc-
ture. Standardized subsystems, which could be 
produced economically in quantity, could be 
used instead of customized subsystems de-
signed to weigh less. 
The savings that might be realized are uncer-
tain. In principle, they could be estimated by 
comparing the costs of a heavy payload and a 
light payload that perform the same functions 
with the same capability. However, the United 
States has never designed and built two pay-
loads, one heavy and the other light, that 
perform the same functions equally well, in 
order to compare actual costs. A few estimates 
have been derived by comparing the cost and 
weight of an actual spacecraft with the estimated 
cost and weight of hypothetical heavier space-
craft of comparable capability. Designers have 
also compared the estimated costs and weights 
of hypothetical spacecraft of comparable capa-
bility and different weights. All such studies 
predict payloads could cost less if allowed to 
weigh more, but the estimates of savings differ. 
An accurate estimate of potential savings 
requires a detailed trade-off analysis for each 
payload. Achieving these savings will probably 
require giving spacecraft program managers, 
and those who establish mission and spacecraft 
requirements, incentives crafted specifically for 
the purpose, and may require developing new 
launch or orbital-transfer vehicles to carry the 
spacecraft. 
Lightsats: If allowed to be less capable, 
reliable, or long-lived, payloads could be both 
lighter and less expensive. Useful functions 
such as communications and weather surveil-
lance could be performed by payloads small 
enough to be launched on small rockets from 
airborne or transportable launchers. 
Chapter J-Summary • 3 
Small, simple, and relatively inexpensive 
civil and military satellites have been, and still 
are, launched at relatively low cost on small 
launch vehicles or at even lower cost, sometimes 
for free, as "piggyback" payloads on larger 
launch vehicles. 
The Department of Defense is considering 
whether the increased survivability and respon-
siveness such spacecraft CQuld provide would 
compensate for possibly decreased capability. 
Some missions might be accomplished as well 
by a swarm of several small satellites as by a 
single large one. If so, a swarm would be less 
expensive in many cases, because smaller satel-
lites typically cost much less per pound than do 
large ones. Even if the satellites were launched 
individually, which would increase total launch 
cost, total mission cost might be lower. 
Microspacecraft: Spacecraft weighing only 
a few pounds could perform useful space 
science missions and might be uniquely eco-
nomical for experiments requiring simulta-
neous measurements (e.g., of solar wind) at 
many widely separated points about the 
Earth, another planet, or the Sun. 
These could be launched on existing launch 
vehicles. Eventually, it may be possible to 
launch them on laser-powered rockets or, if they 
are as rugged as a cannon-launched guided 
projectile,lO with a ram cannon or an electro-
magnetic launcher. Within the next decade, 
experiments now being planned may establish 
the feasibility of some of these launch systems. 
Their costs cannot be estimated confidently 
until feasibility is proven, but at high launch 
rates they might be more economical than 
conventional rockets. An electromagnetic launcher 
could also be constructed in orbit to launch 
microspaceprobes to outer planets; they would 
arrive years earlier than if they were propelled 
by conventional rockets. 
lOA cannon-launched guided projectile is an artillery shell equipped with a system (e.g. TV camera and computer) for recognizing a target and 
movable fins or other means for steering the projectile toward a target. The Army's M712 Copperhead is an example. 
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OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 
What can Congress do to promote spacecraft 
cost reduction and, thereby, reduce the cost of 
space programs? Some options deal directly 
with spacecraft design; others would promote 
the development of launch systems that could 
launch small, inexpensive spacecraft at low cost 
or heavy spacecraft with generous weight mar-
gins. 
Options for Influencing Spacecraft Design 
Option 1: 
Congress could order a comprehensive study 
of how much the Nation could save on space 
programs by: 
• designing payloads to reserve more weight 
and volume margin on a launch vehicle; 
• allowing payloads to be heavier, less 
capable, shorter-lived, or less reliable; 
• designing standard subsystems and buses 
for use in a variety of spacecraft; 
• designing spacecraft to perform single 
rather than multiple missions; and 
• using several inexpensive satellites instead 
of a single expensive one. 
Lockheed completed such a study in 1972; 11 
a new one should consider current mission needs 
and technology. It would complement the Space 
Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) and 
more recent and ongoing studies12 that compare 
space transportation options but not payload 
design options. 
As noted above, to estimate potential savings 
accurately, a detailed trade-off analysis must be 
done for each payload, or more generally, for 
each mission. So, for greater credibility: 
Option 2: 
Congress could require selected spacecraft 
programs-for example, those that might re-
quire a new launch vehicle to be developed-to 
award two design contracts, one to a contractor 
who would consider the unconventional ap-
proaches mentioned above. 
Option 3: 
Congress could require both the Department 
of Defense and NASA to refrain from developing 
a spacecraft if the expected weight or size of the 
spacecraft, together with its propellants, upper 
stage, and support equipment, would exceed 
some fraction of the maximum weight or size 
that its intended launch vehicle can accommo-
date. Public Law 100-456 required the De-
partment of Defense to require at least 15 
percent weight margin in fiscal year 1989.13 
New legislation could extend this restriction to 
NASA and could require size margins in future 
years. 
Options for Promoting the Development of 
Launch Systems 
Option 4: 
Congress could fund the development of the 
Shuttle-C cargo launch vehicle, the Advanced 
Launch System, liquid-fueled rocket boosters 
for the Shuttle, or a larger Titan launch 
vehicle. 14 Any of these vehicles could launch 
payloads larger and thus less expensive (for 
comparable performance) than payloads de-
signed to fly on Shuttles or Titan IVs~ Alterna-
tively, if payload size and weight are not 
increased, these proposed launch vehicles could 
provide greater size and weight margins, thereby 
reducing the risk of needing costly weight-
reduction efforts. However, their greater pay-
load capacity would also enable payload pro-
llLockheed Missiles and Space Co., Impact of Low-Cost Refurbishable and Standard Spacecraft Upon Future NASA Space Programs, NTIS 
N72-27913, Apr. 30, 1972. 
12E.g., the Air Force's Air Force-Focused STAS, NASA's Next Manned Space Transportation System study, the Defense Science Board's National 
Space Launch Strategy study, and the Space Transportation Comparison study for the National Aero-Space Plane Program. 
\3See S. Rept. 100-326, p. 36, and H. Rept. 100-989, p. 282. 
14The costs and benefits of these launch systems would differ; see U.S. Congress, op. cit., footnote I, and the forthcoming finm report of this 
assessment. 
gram managers to forego these potential savings 
and instead pursue greater payload performance 
by increasing payload size or weight. If they do 
so and weight overrun occurs, it would probably 
cost more to trim the weight of a larger payload 
than it would to reduce the weight of a lighter 
payload by the same percentage. Requiring 
weight margins, as described above, would 
reduce this risk. 
Option 5: 
Congress could continue to fund the develop-
ment of the Standard Small Launch Vehicle 
(SSLyt5) and the Sea Launch and Recovery 
(SEALAR) system16 to provide survivable means 
of launching military lightsats. The Department 
of Defense probably will not allow operational 
lightsats to be designed for such launch vehicles 
until the vehicles are operational. Hybrid rock-
ets, which can use liquid oxygen to burn 
nonexplosive solid propellant similar to tire 
rubber, could also be designed to launch 
lightsats from transportable launchers. Such 
hybrids would have some safety advantages and 
might be allowed where conventional solid- or 
liquid-fuel rockets are not. Later-perhaps by 
2005-NASP-derived vehicles might be able to 
launch 20,000-pound payloads in wartimeP 
With continued funding, the National Aero-
Space Plane Program would continue to develop 
technology for NASP-derived vehicles. 
Option 6: 
Congress could fund the development of a 
laser or a direct-launch system (e.g., a railgun, 
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coilgun, or ram cannon) for launching micro-
spacecraft at high rates economically. Many 
uses have been proposed, but to date only the 
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SOlO) 
has identified a plausible demand for high-rate 
launches of microspacecraft. However, demand 
for launches of scientific, commercial, and other 
microspacecraftcould increase, perhaps dramat-
ically, if launch costs could be reduced to a few 
hundred dollars per pound and payloads were 
inexpensive. The SOlO estimates development 
and construction· of a laser for launching 44-
pound payloads would require about $550 
million over 5 or 6 years. The SOlO estimates 
it could launch up to 100 payloads per day (more 
than 20 Shuttle loads per year) for about $200 
per pound. 
Railgun proponents predict a prototype 
railgun capable oflaunching 1,1 OO-pound projec-
tiles carrying 550 pounds of payload could be 
developed in about 9 years for between $900 
million and $6 billion, including $50 million to 
$5 billion for development of projectiles and 
tracking technology. If produced and launched 
at a rate of 10,000 per year, the projectiles (less 
payload) would cost between $500 and $30,000 
per pound (estimates differ). The cost oflaunch-
ing them might be as low as $20 per pound-i.e., 
$40 per pound of payload. 
ISThe SSLV is being developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 
16SEALAR is being developed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory. 
17See U.S. Congress, op. cit., footnote 4, pp. 67 and 74. 
As payloads progress from the drawing board (or 
computer-aided design workstation) to the launch 
pad, their volumes tend to expand to fill the payload 
fairings of their betrothed launch vehicles, and their 
weights tend to grow to the maximum that the launch 
vehicles can launch. Dry weights of representative 
U.S. military satellites have been about 25 percent 
greater, on the average, than the estimates of dry 
weight made when they were proposed. l On occa-
sion, satellites grow so heavy that their assigned 
launch vehicles would be unable to place them in the 
desired orbits. When this happens, drastic and 
expensive efforts are undertaken to reduce the 
weight of the satellite-and sometimes of the launch 
vehicle as well. A TRW executive has said, "We 
have to spend numbers like $150,000 a pound trying 
to get the last few pounds out of a spacecraft. "2 
A contract for spacecraft development and pro-
duction typically specifies that the spacecraft per-
form certain functions and not weigh more than a 
specified maximum weight. Usually this maximum 
weight is chosen to be less than the maximum weight 
a particular launch vehicle can place in the desired 
orbit. The difference between these two values 
provides a margin that allows for contingencies such 
as less-than-expected launch vehicle thrust. 
The spacecraft designer initially tries to design the 
spacecraft to perform the specified functions and not 
weigh more than the specified maximum weight, 
minus 
1. a "contingency" amount by which the esti-
mated weight of the spacecraft is expected to 
grow as the design matures, and 
2. a "weight margin" representing greater-than-
expected growth in the estimated weight as the 
design matures. 
Based on its experience producing high-tech govern-
ment spacecraft and spacecraft subsystems, TRW 
expects weight to grow ultimately 15 percent larger 
than initial estimates and hence budgets a contin-
gency of 15 percent initially. As the design matures 
and the estimated weight increases as expected, the 
contingency budget is decreased. 
Chapter 2 
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TRW may also allow a margin of 15 percent or 
more for greater-than-expected weight growth, ini-
tially. TRW estimates that the value of weight 
margin increases with decreasing margin, from zero 
at 15 percent margin, to $5,000 to $10,000 per pound 
at 5 to 10 percent margin, to $40,000 per pound at ° 
percent margin, to as much as $100,000 per pound 
at negative margin, depending on the time remaining 
before launch (figure 2-1). Margins are seldom 
negative at an early design stage; if margin becomes 
negative shortly before the spacecraft is to be 
launched, expensive redesign may be required to 
reduce the spacecraft weight below the maximum 
weight specified in the contract, and TRW estimates 
that it may be worth up to about $100,000 per pound 
to avoid this. This is much greater than the cost of 
transporting a typical spacecraft to its operational 
orbit: about $15,000 to $30,000 per pound to 
geosynchronous orbit, as estimated by TRW.3 
TRW notes that spacecraft designed to incor-
porate advanced-technology subsystems can con-
sume weight margins with unusual rapidity, leading 
to redesign (which may require 3 or 4 months), 
increased risk, and possibly additional redesign, as 
well as downward revision of' 'requirements." Two 
Figure 2-1-Value of Weight Margin 
Marginal value of margin ($1,OOO/lb.) 
-- GEO laun h (Titan IV + IUS) 
40 
20 
Gold-- __ LEO launch (Titan IV) 
0~----~------~----~---==4~--~ 
-5 0 5 10 15 20 
Weight margin (percent) 
SOURCE: TRW (plotted by OTA). 
lp. Hillebrandtet al., Space Division Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model, SixlhEdition, SD TR-88-97 (Los Angeles AFB, CA: Headquarters, Space 
Systems Division, U.S. Air Force Systems Command, November 1988), p. VIII-6; distribution limited to U.S. Government agencies only. 
2G.W. Elverum, Jr., • 'Reliability Up!Costs Down Through Simplicity," Space Systems Productivity and Manufacturing Coriference IV (EI Segundo, 
CA: Aerospace Corp., 1987), pp. 175-196. 
3Clarlt Kirby, TRW, personal communication, Nov. 16, 1988. 
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redesign cycles totaling 6 to 8 months could lead to 
a 10 to 25 percent cost growth. TRW also notes that 
volume constraints are also costly. 
How much margin should be reserved? Reserving 
too little increases the risk of delay and cost overrun, 
should redesign become necessary, because weight 
growth exceeds expectations late in a development 
program. Yet reserving too much margin imposes an 
opportunity cost: one either foregoes the opportunity 
to add extra fuel or equipment, and hence capability, 
to the payload, or one foregoes the opportunity to 
make the payload less expensive by allowing it to be 
heavier. In the latter case, the opportunity cost is 
tangible and can be estimated.4 The optimal margin 
will be that at which the marginal opportunity cost 
of not making the payload a pound heavier equals 
the marginal value that the additional margin would 
provide by reducing risk of cost overrun and 
schedule slippage. 
If the marginal value of weight margin is as 
estimated by TRW (see figure 2-1), then a margin of 
11 to 12 percent would be optimal for a Titan IV 
payload.5 This is comparable to the margin (15 
percent) that Public Law 100-456 required the 
Department of Defense to reserve for satellites DoD 
approves for development in fiscal year 1989. In 
reporting on the National Defense Authorization Act 
for fiscal year 1989, the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services proposed requiring that 
... the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
shall not approve for development a new satellite if 
the proposed payload weight exceeds 85 percent of 
the lift capacity of the launch vehicle(s) identified 
4See "A Parametric Analysis" in ch. 3. 
with the proposed satellite, and shall not approve for 
development a block change if the proposed payload 
weight exceeds the weight of the existing payload;6 
This language was endorsed in conference 7 and 
signed into law. 8 
The expectation that increasing weight margins 
would reduce cost risk does not imply that it would 
save money to build a new launch vehicle large 
enough to launch the heaviest payloads with in-
creased weight margins. Predicting whether it would 
save money would require comparing the cost of 
developing the vehicle with the total benefits it 
would provide-including the reduction in cost risk 
that increased weight margins would provide. Ironi-
cally, building larger launch vehicles could increase 
this risk: Without discipline, payloads might still be 
designed to allow little margin, and margins could 
still be tight or negative, but with greater conse-
quence. To eliminate a I-percent negative margin, 
one would have to trim 2,000 pounds from a 
200,000-pgund payload, compared to only 390 
pounds in the case of a 39,000-pound payload. In 
some cases this could be done by carrying less fuel 
than planned and accepting reduced payload per-
formance. If not, reducing the dry weight of a 
200,OOO-pound payload by 1 percent would cost 
$240 million more than reducing the dry weight of 
a 39,000-pound payload by 1 percent, if weight 
reduction costs $150,000 per pound. This illustrates 
why allowing margin for, and controlling, weight 
growth will be much more important for large 
payloads (such as proposed heavy-lift launch vehi-
cles could carry) than for smaller ones. 
sViz. a payload that would cost between $100 million and $5 billion if built to weigh 39,000 poWlds-i.e., to reserve no margin. 
68. Rept. 100-326, p. 36. 
7H. Rept. 100-989, p. 282. 
as. Rept. 100-326 did not specify whether the [estimate of] proposed satellite weight should include expected weight growth in addition to the nominal 
weight estimated from the design for the satellite. If so, Public Law 100-456 would require at least a 15 percent weight margin in addition to whatever 
weight growth is expected. If the payload consisted solely of an unfueled satellite, 25 percent weight growth would be expected [Po Hillebrandt et aI., 
op. cit., footnote I, pp. VIll-61, so Public Law 100-456 would require a40 percent weight margin in addition to the nominal weight estimated from tile 
design for the satellite. 
Many experts find it plausible that a payload 
could be designed to perfonn a function at lower cost 
if it were allowed to be heavier. However, there have 
been few attempts to estimate just how much cheaper 
payloads could be, if allowed to be heavier, or how 
much they should weigh in order to minimize the 
total cost of producing and launching a payload. 
The first section of this chapter discusses one of 
several ways in which payloads could be made less 
expensive if allowed to be heavier: standard subsys-
tems could be used in lieu of customized subsystems 
designed to minimize weight. The next section 
describes how a high-altitude satellite could be 
allowed to be heavier (and hence less expensive) 
without using a larger launch vehicle: by using an 
orbital transfer vehicle with electric engines (e.g., 
an::jets). The third section discusses estimation of 
cost versus weight trade-offs, with subsections 
describing parametric and bottom-up methods and 
comparing parametric with bottom-up estimates. 
The final section discusses some organizational 
obstacles to reducing cost by allowing payload 
weight growth. 
STANDARDIZING SUBSYSTEMS 
One of several ways to trade off cost for weight is 
to use standard spacecraft subsystemsl or busses.2 
The use of a standard or previously developed 
subsystem may result in a heavier spacecraft but 
allow a satellite program to avoid paying part or all 
of the substantial nonrecurring costs of developing 
a custom subsystem. In addition, because of learning 
and production-rate effects, it helps reduce the 
recurring cost of producing the standard subsystem. 
Using a standard subsystem could reduce subsys-
tem cost by a factor roughly equal to 1 plus the ratio 
Chapter 3 
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(expressed as a fraction) of nontecurring to recurring 
cost. For example, the ratio of nonrecurring cost to 
recurring cost is typically 2/1 for a spacecraft bus 
(see table 3-1), so the nonrecurring cost of develop-
ing a spacecraft bus is about twice the recurring cost 
of producing a bus. If a mission requires one 
spacecraft, the cost of developing and producing a 
custom bus would be about three times the cost of 
producing a suitable previously developed bus. By 
using a previously developed bus, one could there-
fore save about two-thirds of the cost of a custom-
ized bus.3 The cost would be reduced by a factor of 
3, i.e., by 1 plus the ratio of nonrecurring cost to 
recurring cost (2/1). 
More could be saved on subsystems with higher 
ratios. For example, the cost of structure, which has 
ratios ranging from 5/1 to 8/1, could be reduced by 
a factor of at least 6, and possibly 9. 
The amount saved could be a small percentage of 
total spacecraft program costs, which also include 
the costs of mission-peculiar payloads and program 
overhead, etc. A 1972 Lockheed study4 concluded 
that development and use of standard subsystems 
could save only about 4 percent of the cost of 91 
payload programs, when used in addition to low-cost 
design methods and payload refurbishment. The 
savings attributable to standardization would be 
about 6 percent of the program costs already reduced 
by low-cost design and refurbishment.s 
Manufacturers have estimated that 95 percent 
learning might be achieved, i.e., every time the 
cumulative number of units produced is doubled, the 
incremental unit cost woWa decrease 5 percent. 6 The 
Air Force has ass~ ~ percent learning in 
estimating first-unit pFoduction costs from lot sizes 
1See• e.g .• Lockheed Missiles and Space Co .• Impact ofLow-Cost Refurbishable and Standard Spacecraft Upon Future NASA Space Programs. NTIS 
N72-279l3. Apr. 30. 1972. 
2A spacecraft' 'bus" consists of those spacecraft subsystem&--<:.g. structure. thermal control. telemetry. attitude control. power. and propulsion-that 
are nOI peculiar to a particular mission. as cameras or radio relays would be. 
3The cost of integrating an off-the-shelf subsystem into a spacecraft is smail. The Boeing Company's Parametric Cost Model predicts that the c~st 
of integrating an off-the-shelf subsystem into a spacecraft would be about 3 percent of the cost of designing a new subsystem for the spacecraft. [Boemg 
Aerospace Co .• May 1989] 
4Lockheed Missiles and Space Co .• op. cit.. footnote 1. 
sin this study. Lockheed assumed a "mission model" now recognized as highly inflated; this probably led to ov.erestimation of the potential savings 
from standardization. On the other hand. the percentage savings attributable to standardization might have been greater if refurbishment had not been 
assumed. ' 
. 6F.K. Fong el aI .• Unmanned Spacecraft Cost Model. 5th ed .• SD-TR-81-45 (Los Angeles AFB. CA: HeadquarterS. Space Sy~s Dinrision. U.S. 
Air Force Systems Command. June 1981); NTIS accession number AD-B06O 824L; distribution limited to U.S. Govermnent agencIes 0 y. 
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Table 3-1-Ratlos of Nonrecurring to Recurring Cost 
of Spacecraft Subsystems 
If a previOUsly developed subsystem can be used in a new spacecraft 
in lieu of a custom-designed subsystem, subsystem cost could be 
reduced by a factor roughly equal to one plus the ratio of nonrecurring 
to recurring cost-e.g., threefold for a spacecraft bus (a space-
craft without its mission payload). 
Subsystem 
Structure ............................ . 
Propulsion (apogee kick) .............. . 
Thermal control ...................... . 
Attitude control ....................... . 
Electrical power ...................... . 
Telemetry, tracking, & command ........ . 
Spacecraft (less mission payload) ....... . 
Communications mission payload ....... . 
Ranges of ratios 
nonrecurring cost! 
recurring cost 
5/1 to 8/1 
211 to 6/1 
4/1 to 40/1 
1/1 to 211 
1/1 to 211 
211 to 3/1 
about 2/1 
211 to 3/1 
SOURCE: U.S. Air Force Systems Command, Space Systems Division. 
and prices,7 but there have been too few buys of each 
type of U.S. spacecraft to demonstrate learning 
conclusively. 
UPPER STAGES AND ORBITAL-
TRANSFER VEHICLES 
Often a payload has an upper stage or an 
orbital-transfer vehicle (OTV) in addition to a 
spacecraft. Some analysts have considered options 
for reducing the costs of upper stages by allowing 
them to be heavier.8 Others are considering the 
opposite approach: making OTVs smaller-and 
perhaps more expensive--in order to save money by 
using a smaller launch vehicle, allowing the space-
craft to be larger, or providing more margin for 
spacecraft weight growth. Space-based OTV shave 
also been proposed;9 they could be reused and would 
not be launched together with the spacecraft, which 
could therefore be larger. However, refueling and 
maintaining them could be complicated and might 
require the development and maintenance of costly 
space- or ground-based infrastructure. 
Electric propulsion could be used to make OTV s 
smaller and lighter while at the same time increasing 
the mass they could deliver to a high orbit. They 
could use photovoltaic ("solar") cells to generate 
electricity 10 to power an electrostatic ion thruster, an 
arcjet thruster, or an electric engine of some other 
type (many are possible) that has an exhaust velocity 
much greater than that of a chemical rocket. This 
would reduce the mass of fuel required for orbital 
transfer, increasing the payload that could be trans-
ferred. The "dry weight" of an electric OTV 
(EOTV) could also be smaller than that of a chemical 
OTV of comparable total impulse, further increasing 
the payload that could be transferred. 
There would be drawbacks. An EOTV would 
produce little thrust, so transfer of a payload from a 
low-altitude parking orbit to geostationary orbit 
might take 3 to 6 months. Before reaching its 
destination orbit, the payload would age a few 
months and, more important, might degrade because 
of its longer transit through the Van Allen radiation 
belts. An EOTV would be designed to tolerate such 
a transit, but some satellites might not be. A 
near-term solution would be to shield sensitive 
satellites against the radiation, but this would reduce 
the maximum satellite mass that could be carried. 
The longer transfer time could also be detrimental 
to security. A military satellite on an EOTV would 
remain longer at low altitude and within range of 
low-altitude anti-satellite weapons than if it rode a 
conventional OTV to its destination orbit. If a 
critical satellite fails or is damaged, an EOTV might 
not be able to replace it without a serious lapse in 
mission performance. II These drawbacks could be 
mitigated by launching military satellites on sched-
ule rather than on demand. That is, near the end of 
its projected useful life, each satellite would be 
deactivated, maintained as a spare, and replaced by 
a new satellite, which could have been launched 
months earlier. 
The Air Force Systems Command Space Systems 
Division estimates that EOTVs would be more 
economical than conventional OTV s for selected 
7p. Hillebrandt et al., Space Division Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model, Sixth Edition, SO TR-88-97 (Los Angeles AFB, CA: Headquarters, Space 
Systems Division, U.S. Air Force Systems Command, November 1988); distribution limited to U.S. Government agencies only. 
80ani Eder, "Why Spacecraft Should Get Less Expensive If Launch Costs Oecrease," unpublished, undated, marked "0582-10003-1." Boeing 
presented results of this analysis at the ALS Phase 1 System Requirements Review, and to OTA in a briefing, .. ALS Program Development.'· See also 
Hughes Aircraft Co., Space and Communications Group, Design Guide for ALS Payloads. October 1988. 
9E.g., see Lockheed Missiles and Space Co .. Final ReporE-Payload Effects Analysis Study, LMSC-A990556 (Sunnyvale, CA: June 1971). NTIS 
accession number N71-3749630; and J .M. Sponable and J.P. Penn, "Electric Propulsion for Orbit Transfer: A Case Study," Journal of Propulsion and 
Power, vol. 5, No.4, July-August 1989. pp. 445451. 
IONuclear power was once considered more promising; see Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., op. cit., footnote 9. 
II However. in some scenarios, neither could a conventional OTY. 
mISSIons. For example, a 5,250-pound spacecraft 
could be launched to geostationary orbit either on a 
Titan IV launch vehicle with an Inertial Upper Stage 
for about $250 million or on a Delta II launch vehicle 
with a solar-electric OTV for about $124 million,12 
saving about $126 million. A Titan IV with an 
EOTV could launch a 30,OOO-pound spacecraft to 
geostationary orbit for an estimated cost of $269 
million. The Space Systems Division is planning to 
demonstrate an expendable solar-powered EOTV, 
probably with an experimental payload, sometime 
between 1993 and 1995. 
ESTIMATING POTENTIAL 
COST REDUCTION 
There have been few attempts to estimate how 
much cheaper spacecraft could be, if allowed to be 
heavier, or optimal weights for minimal production 
and launch costs. Analyses of historical data show 
that heavier spacecraft are typically costlier than 
lighter spacecraft; 13 usually, however, heavier space-
craft are also more capable than lighter spacecraft. 
They perform more functions, more difficult func-
tions, or similar functions better. 14 So these analyses 
do not answer the important questions: 
1. How heavy should a payloadlS be in order to 
minimize the combined costs of payload 
production and launch on a currently opera-
tional launch vehicle? Are payload weights 
actually optimized for current launch vehicles? 
2. How heavy should a payload be in order to 
minimize combined production and launch 
cost, if the launch cost per pound of payload 
were reduced, or the maximum payload weight 
that could be launched were increased, by 
some factor? By what factor would total 
payload production and launch cost be re-
duced? 
Answering these questions requires comparing 
the costs of heavy payloads and light payloads that 
perform the same function equally well. Unfortu-
nately, such data do not exist; there are no two 
12Including $3 million for RDT&E. 
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payloads, one large and the other small, designed at 
the same time (and hence with comparable technol-
ogy available) to perform the same set of functions 
equally well. The few analyses that have estimated 
how much cheaper a payload could be if allowed to 
be heavier have been hypothetical. They are based 
on both "bottom-up" and parametric estimates. 
Bottom-up estimates are obtained by designing 
two or more versions of a payload to perform the 
same functions at minimum cost without exceeding 
weight or size limits, which differ from version to 
version. For example, two versions of a communica-
tions satellite could be designed: one to be launched 
on a Scout launch vehicle, the other on an Atlas-
Centaur. Each version would be designed to mini-
mize production and launch cost. Comparing the 
costs of the two different versions would indicate 
how much less expensive the larger version would 
be. 
Bottom-up estimates are time-consuming and 
expensive to derive, and there may be no basis for 
assuming the cost-versus-weight trade-offs derived 
would apply to versions larger or smaller than those 
designed or to payloads that must perform different 
functions. For example, there is no rationale for 
expecting that bottom-up estimates of costs and 
weights of communications satellites of comparable 
capability could be used to illustrate cost-versus-
weight trade-offs for remote-sensing satellites of 
comparable capability. 
Parametric estimates are obtained by assuming 
that if the weight of a payload were allowed to 
increase, the minimum cost at which it could be built 
would vary in some qualitative way-e.g., approach 
a limit, or decrease exponentially. The parameters of 
the relationship-e.g., the minimum costs for partic-
ular weight limits-are chosen to make the hypo-
thetical relationship fit historical cost and weight 
data, bottom-up cost and weight estimates, or both, 
as well as possible. 
The fit will not be exact, however; 16 it may be a 
good fit on the average, with some payloads costing 
13p. Hillebrandt et al., op. cit., footnote 7, and figure 4-1 of Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., op. cit., footnote 9. 
14See Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., op. cit., footnote 9. 
ISThe payload of a launch vehicle may be a spacecraft (e.g., a satellite or planetary probe) together with an upper stage (to propel it to a transfer orbit 
or escape trajectory) and support equipment for attaching them to and releasing them from the launch vehicle. Some launch vehicles (e.g., the Space 
Shuttle and sounding rockets) sometimes carry payloads (e.g., scientific instruments) that remain attached to the launch vehicle. 
16Unless there are so many parameters (i.e., statistical degrees of freedom) in the model that the available data are too few to estimate them with 
statistical significance. 
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more, and others less, than predicted by the relation-
ship (the "model"). The fact that the model 
represents only average costs and cost-versus-
weight trends may be an advantage in studies, such 
as this one, which focus on such averages and trends. 
However, it would be a limitation if accurate 
cost-versus-weight trade-offs for a specific mission 
were required. If the functions to be performed by 
the payload were specified in detail, and if resources 
permitted detailed engineering design of several 
alternative versions of different weights or sizes, 
then bottom-up estimation could be used and should 
provide greater accuracy. 
Thus bottom-up estimation and parametric esti-
mation are complementary approaches to cost esti-
mation.l7 Neither approach by itself would be of 
general value: a bottom-up estimate is applicable 
only to a specific payload, and parametric estimates 
are abstract and hence useless unless fitted to 
bottom-up estimates of cost and weight. I8 
The bottom-up and parametric approaches are 
exemplified by two analyses produced almost two 
decades ago: a parametric model developed by Carl 
Builder at the Rand COrp.,19 and a bottom-up 
analysis by Lockheed Missiles and Space CO.2O Both 
were cited in congressional debate on the merits of 
the Space Shuttle.21 
A Parametric Analysis 
Builder did not estimate cost reductions for 
particular payloads; he described a procedure for 
doing so using data or assumptions about payload 
cost and launch cost. He assumed average launch 
cost would vary as the payload capability of the 
launch vehicle raised to some power A (this is called 
a "power-law" relationship) and payload cost 
would vary as the payload weight raised to some 
power B. To use Builder's model, one must specify 
the exportent A and the initial cost and weight of a 
payload designed to minimize payload plus current 
launch cost. One need not specify what the payload 
does; in theory, it should make no difference. If 
launch costs are reduced by some factor,22 the 
optimum weight and the cost of a functionally 
equivalent payload designed to minimize payload 
plus reduced launch cost may be calculated using 
formulas derived by Builder. The difference be-
tween the old and new minimum total costs is the 
savings obtainable if launch costs are reduced by the 
specified factor, assuming payloads are reoptimized 
to take advantage of the new launch costs.23 
OTA derived an estimate of the exponent A used 
in Builder's model by fitting a straight line to points 
on a log-log plot of the payload capabilities24 and 
average launch costs25 of Delta, Titan, and the Space 
Shuttle. Figure 3-1 shows the three points and the 
line obtained as a least-squares fit to the points. The 
slope of the line corresponds to a value of 0.74 for 
the exponent A, implying that average launch cost 
would increase by two-thirds if the payload weight 
were doubled. 
Figure 3-1 also shows a point representing the 
predicted payload capability of the Pegasus air-
launched vehicle (see figure 4-6) and the price 
charged by its operator, Orbital Sciences Corp. 
(OSC) , for the launches and launch options pur-
chased by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency. The line fitted to Delta, Titan, and Shuttle 
costs and payload capabilities accurately predicted 
the cost (to the government) of a Pegasus launch. 
If launch cost is assumed to vary with payload 
weight in the way described above,26 Builder's 
model predicts that a payload that would cost $1 
billion if designed to weigh 39,000 pounds could be 
17U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-ISC-28 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988), app. A. 
18 As noted above, there is seldom more than one historical • 'data point" for the COSI and weight of functionally identical spaceraft. 
19CarI H. Builder, Are Launch Vehicle Costs a Bottleneck to Economical Space Operations? Rand working document D-I9482-PR, December 1969. 
2IlI..ockheed Missiles and Space Co., op. cit., footnote 9. 
:uSee the remarks of Senator Mondaie in the Congressional Record-&nare, May 26, 1971, pp. 17100-17106, and the remarks of Senator Anderson 
in the Congressional Record-Senate, Apr. 20, 1972, pp. 13786-13790. 
22By the same factor, regardless of payload weight. 
23More precisely, "assuming payloads are optimally sized for minimum total cost in both cases." Builder, op. cit., footnote 19. 
24Th a 100 n.mi.-high orbit inclined 28.5 degrees. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options/or the Future: A Buyer's Guide, 
OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988), table 2-1. 
2SIncluding amortized fixed annual launch cost. OTA assumed launch at the maximum rate estimated in table A-I of ibid. and used the nominal 
COSI-estimating relationships in that table. 
26I.e., in proportion to the payload capability of the launch vehiCle raised to the power 0.74. 
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SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment and Orbital Sciences Corp., 
1988. 
made for 5.8 percent less if it were allowed to be 
twice as heavy. More generally, if allowed to be 
heavier or designed to be lighter, the cost of such a 
payload would be proportional to its weight raised to 
the power -0.086 (the exponent B in Builder's 
model). Figure 3-2 shows how the payload cost and 
the launch cost would vary with the payload weight 
Designing the payload to weigh 39,000 pounds 
would minimize the total cost. 
Figure 3-3 shows how the payload cost and the 
launch cost would vary with the payload weight if 
launch cost were reduced by a factor of 3--Le., by 67 
percent. It illustrates that total cost is insensitive to 
weight for weights between 80,000 pounds and (at 
least) 200,000 pounds. The optimal weight would be 
about 150,000 pounds. Reducing the launch cost by 
67 percent would reduce the total cost by only 11 
percent. It should be emphasized that this is the 
estimated cost reduction achievable by aI/owing 
payload weight to grow without changing payload 
performance. It assumes that the baseline payload 
was designed to minimize total cost. If a baseline 
payload was not designed to minimize total cost, 
redesigning it (possibly to weigh more) could save 
money even if launch costs are not reduced. If launch 
costs are reduced, additional savings could be 
obtained by allowing weight growth; these addi-
tional savings are the savings estimated by Builder's 
model. 
Figure 3-4 shows these results in a different fonn 
along with results of similar analyses of other 
hypothetical payloads initially weighing 39,000 
pounds but costing $2 billion,· $3 billion, and $4 
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Figure 3-2--Cost for Hypothetical Mission With 
Current Launch Cost Trend 
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Figure 3-3-Cost for Hypothetical Mission If Launch 
Costs Are Reduced 67 Percent 
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SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
billion. Figure 3-4a shows how these costs could be 
reduced, according to Builder's model, if the 
weights were allowed to grow. For each weight, 
figure 3-4b shows the ("economic") launch cost at 
which that weight would be optimal. These esti-
mates predict that allowing the weight of a Titan-IV-
class payload to increase by 400 percent (for 
example) would reduce payload cost by an amount 
that is nearly the same for a $1-billion payload as for 
a $4-billion payload. The estimates also predict that 
the lower the initial cost of a payload, the more the 
cost per launch must be reduced to justify increasing 
its weight by a large factor. 
Builder's assumption about the relationship be-
tween payload weight and launch cost would lose 
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Figure 3-4-Payload Cost v. Weight Trade-offs and 
EconomiC Launch Costs 
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validity if extrapolated to extremely heavy pay-
10ads.27 It would imply that the average cost of 
launching a pound of payload could be made as low 
as desired-even lower than the cost of the fuel 
required to launch a pound of payload-by building 
a launch vehicle of sufficiently large payload 
capability. But his assumption fits the estimates of 
Pegasus, Delta, Titan, and Shuttle launch costs in 
27If A is less than one. 
28If B is less than one. 
figure 3-1 very well. The cost-versus-payload curve 
fitted to Delta, Titan, and Shuttle launch costs 
predicted the cost of Pegasus accurately, even 
though the payload capability of Pegasus is eightfold 
smaller than that of the smallest vehicle (Delta) on 
which the curve is based. The curve could probably 
be extrapolated with comparable validity to a 
payload capability of 200,000 pounds. 
Similarly, Builder's assumption about the rela-
tionship between payload weight and payload cost 
would also lose validity if extrapolated to extremely 
heavy payloads.28 It would imply that they could be 
built at a lower cost per pound than that of the bulk 
structural material (e.g., aluminum) from which they 
are made. However, this is not a problem for the 
ranges of payload weights and costs shown in figure 
3-4. 
Bottom-Up Analyses 
Lockheed used bottom-up analysis to estimate 
how much the cost of building, launching, and 
operating selected payloads could be reduced by 
making them larger29 and by other measures.30 Lock-
heed considered three payloads, selected to span a 
range of costs, that had been built and launched and 
for which design and cost data were available. The 
least expensive was the Lockheed P-l1 subsatellite, 
which could be modified for use as a Small Research 
Satellite (SRS). The most expensive was the Orbit-
ing Astronomical Observatory, the redesigned ver-
sion of which was designated OAO-B. The other 
was the Lunar Orbiter, which could be modified for 
use as a Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter (SEO), four 
of which could perform Earth resources observation. 
Lockheed estimated how much the costs3l of the 
OAO-B and SE~ payload programs could be 
reduced if the payloads were redesigned to be 
launched on unmanned expendable launch vehicles 
or to be launched on a (then) proposed version of the 
Space Shuttle.32 The savings estimated for the first 
29Lockheed used parametric methods to estimate cost-versus-weight trade-offs for payload subsystems. Lockheed asswned the cost-versus-weight 
trade-off curve for each subsystem was a hyperbola which. for an extremely heavy subsystem. approached a minimwn cost per pound and, at the other 
extreme, approached the minimum weight achievable. 
30E.g., repairing or refurbishing them in orbit or retrieving them to be repaired or refurbished on Earth. 
31 Including costs of research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT &E), production, launch, operation, and replacement (or. if the Shuttle were 
used, refurbishment) of satellites. 
32Lockheed considered two versions. 
case were attributed to payload growth.33 However, 
Lockheed did not redesign the baseline versions of 
OAO-B and SE~ to minimize cost without exceed-
ing the baseline weight, hence Lockheed attributed 
to weight growth some cost reduction that should 
have been attributed to improved design. The 
amount of cost reduction misattributed to weight 
growth cannot be determined from Lockheed's 
report, so the cost reductions Lockheed attributed to 
weight growth should be considered upper bounds 
on cost reductions achievable by allowing weight 
growth. 
Figure 3-5 compares Lockheed's estimates of the 
weights and the average unit costs34 of the baseline 
OAO-B and SE~ with Lockheed's estimates of the 
weights and costs of "low-cost" versions designed 
to be launched on expendable launch vehicles. The 
potential savings in fiscal year 1988 dollars would 
be $10.1 million (21.3 percent) and $43 million 
(15.2 percent) for SE~ and OAO-B, respectively. 
The estimated weight growth required to achieve 
such savings would be 170 percent and 69 percent, 
respectively. 
A more recent bottom-up analysis by Boeing 
Aerospace Co. estimated the cost of a "typical" 
payload could be reduced by a large percentage if 
weight growth by a modest percentage were al-
lowed, and that it would save money to allow such 
weight growth if launch cost per pound were 
reduced.35 For example, Boeing estimated the cost 
could be halved if the weight were allowed to grow 
30 percent (see figure 3-6).36 
Boeing actually considered a payload consisting 
of an upper stage and a hypothetical spacecraft using 
specific subsystem technologies and with subsystem 
weights in an assumed ratio.37 Boeing claimed the 
hypothetical spacecraft was typical, implying that 
similar cost reductions could be expected for other 
types of spacecraft. However, some of the subsystem 
technologies Boeing assumed for the spacecraft 
were atypical. For example, the analysis estimated 
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Figure 3-~f a Satellite Were Allowed To Be Heavier, 
It Could Cost Lass 
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Figure 3-6-The Effect of Reducing Launch Cost on 
the Optimal Weight and Cost of a Payload 
Optimal growth factor 
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Boeing Aerospace Co. estimated that, if average launch cost per 
pound were reduced from $3,600 per pound, it would be 
economical to redesign a hypothetical payload to allow it to be 
heavier by the weight-growth factor indicated and less costly by 
the cost-reduction factor indicated. Boeing assumed that the 
original design minimized the sum of payload and launch costs at 
a launch cost of $3,600 per pound, and that the average launch 
cost per pound does not depend on the payload weight. 
SOURCE: Boeing Aerospace Co., 1988. 
330nly part of the savings estimated for the second case was attributed to payload growth; the rest was attributed to reduced launch cost and to services 
that only a reusable vehicle such as the Shunle could provide: intact abort capability, on-orbit checkout, repair, and refurbishment. Additional savings 
in both cases were attributed to use of improved technology. 
34Thtal program costs, excluding launch costs, divided by the number of satellites launched (6 OAO-B, 20 SEO), inflated to fiscal year 1988 dollars 
by Of A. 
3SEder, op. cit., footnote 8. 
36Advanced Launch System (ALS) program officials have misquoted this result, saying a 50-percent cost reduction would require 70 percent weight 
growth. See, e.g., Thomas M. Irby, "Status of the ALS Program," Space Systems Productivity and Manufacturing Confer::- :"-V (El Segundo, CA: The 
Aerospace Corp., 1988), p. 30. 
37The ratio was allowed to change when the payload was redesigned with relaxed weight constraints. 
16 • Affordable Spacecraft: Design and Launch Alternatives 
the cost and weight of the satellite's electric power 
subsystem by assuming it consisted entirely of solar 
cells (which typically dominate the cost of a 
satellite's power subsystem), with no batteries 
(which typically dominate the weight of a satellite's 
power subsystem). 
Some of. the proposed cost-reducing and weight-
increasing substitutions Boeing proposed--e.g., sub-
stitution of commercial-grade solar cells for spacecraft-
grade (S-class) solar cells-would decrease payload 
reliability and expected lifetime to an extent not 
estimated by Boeing. Thus Boeing did not estimate 
weight-versus-cost trade-offs for equal reliability; 
some of the savings Boeing attributed to weight 
growth should have been attributed to reduced 
reliability.38 Therefore, the savings Boeing attrib-
uted to weight growth may be upper bounds for 
spacecraft of the type Boeing considered. 
Another recent bottom-up analysis estimated 
cost-versus-weight trade-offs for some subsystems 
but not for complete payloads.39 Like earlier studies 
by Lockheed40 and the Aerospace Corp. ,41 it identi-
fied payload "cost drivers"-Le., costly payload 
components or testing-and recommended changes 
in payload design, components, testing, or opera-
tions that might reduce space program cost. Many of 
these changes would require increasing the weight of 
the payload (the "fatsat" approach discussed here) 
or specifying a simpler or easier mission, or fewer 
missions (the "lightsat" approach discussed in 
chapter 4). 
A Comparison 0/ Parametric and 
Bottom-Up Analyses 
Estimates differ on how much cheaper payloads 
could be if they were allowed to grow to a specified 
weight, and how much they should grow if cost per 
launch were reduced to a specified amount. One 
parametric estimate by OTA predicts that a hypo-
thetical expensive payload as heavy as a Titan IV 
could launch could cost about $130 million less if 
allowed to be five times as heavy. It would be 
economical to d~gn the payload to be so heavy if 
it could be launched for less than about $100 
'lli 42 mi on. Less would be saved if the baseline 
payload cost were comparable to or less than the 
average Titan IV launch cost, estimated here as $117 
million. The only bottom-up estimate that could be 
compared to these is one by Boeing, which predicts 
much greater savings (at least 76 percent, or $760 
million for a billion-dollar payload) but is based on 
~ conceptual design for a payload that is atypical in 
Important respects; moreover, the redesigned pay-
load was allowed to use less reliable components, 
and launch cost per pound was assumed to be 
independent of payload weight. 
OTA also derived parametric estimates to com-
pare to detailed bottom-up estimates by Lockheed 
for two spacecraft. Lockheed estimated 66 percent 
greater savings for one spacecraft (SEO), and 360 
pe~ent greater .savings for the other (OAO-B), but 
attributed to weIght growth some savings that should 
hav.e been attributed to optimization of the baseline 
deSIgns. However, ~ese discrepancies are compara-
ble to the unexplamed statistical variations often 
encountered in spacecraft cost estimation. The less 
d~tailed Boeing estimate, if applicable, would pre-
dIct much greater savings than predicted by OTA: 
530 percent more for OAO-B, and at least 630 
percent more for SEO, at the weight growth factor 
proposed by Lockheed.43 
ACHIEVING POTENTIAL COST 
REDUCTION 
Realizing most of the potential savings predicted 
?y the~e estima~es will probably require creation of 
mcenuv~s to dissuade satellite program managers 
an~ desIgn~rs from adding capability, and thereby 
weIght, unul launch vehicle lift margin, engine-out 
38Lockheeddid so and estimated~ow many satell~te~ would be required.to ~ovide comparable mission performance for 10 years. Lockheed concluded 
that use of S-class components, whIch would maxmllze expected satellIte hfe and minimize the number of replacem t . ed uld be 
cost-effective. en s requIr ,wo most 
39Hughes Aircraft Co., op. cit., footnote 8. 
4OJ:.ockheed Missiles and Space Co., op. ciL, footnote 9. 
41Spacecra/t Cost Drivers Study--Final Report: Phase 1 (EI Segundo, CA: The Aerospace Corp., October 1983). 
42The Advanced Launch System is intended to launch such payloads for much less. 
43However, Boeing estimated that it would not be economical to seek the extreme cost reduction predicted lior SE~ un! I h 
reduced by a factor of 36. ess aunc cost per pound were 
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Box 3-A-Fatsats: The Good and Ugly, and the Bad 
HEAO-During a budget crunch, NASA took steps to repackage its High-Energy Astronomical Observatory 
instruments, designed for two Titan payloads, into three Atlas-Centaur payloads. This reduced launch costs by about 
2 x $125K - 3 x $60K = $70K in today's dollars, by TRW's calculation. It also created extra weight margin. This 
allowed designers to design the spacecraft with high safety factors (strength margin etc.), so that they could dispense 
with the costly construction and testing of model and qualification spacecraft.! 
Phobos 1 & 2-In July 1989, two science spacecraft, Phobos 1 and Phobos 2, were launched from the Soviet 
Union toward Phobos, the larger of the two moons of Mars. Their busses were designed and built in the Soviet 
Union, as were some of their instruments; other instruments were designed in Austria, France, Sweden, Switzerland, 
West Germany, and several East European nations participating in Project Phobos. Some of the Soviet instruments 
were designed with generous weight margins. Jochen Kissel, a West German member of the project's scientific 
council, said, "We could use standard printed circuit boards rather than ultraminiaturized parts ... It made 
everything cheaper and simpler."2 
Nevertheless, because of greater-than-expected weight growth, some instruments were removed from one or 
the other spacecraft. The two spacecraft were originally intended to carry identical suites of instruments, so that 
Phobos 2 could perform all functions of Phobos 1 in case Phobos 1 failed, or vice versa. 
As it happened, Phobos 1 did fail. More accurately, contact with Phobos 1 was lost late in 1988, because an 
erroneous command was transmitted to Phobos 1 from the ground. To compensate for the loss, mission directors 
planned to command Phobos 2 to rendezvous with Phobos rather than proceeding to the smaller Martian moon, 
Deimos, as it would have had Phobos 1 succeeded. Phobos 2 lacks the radar mapper, neutron spectrometer, and solar 
x-ray and ultraviolet telescopes ofPhobos 1, but carries an infrared spectrometer and a hopping lander which Phobos 
11acks.3 
Ironically, contact with Phobos 2 was also lost on March 27, 1989, about two weeks before the planned 
encounter with Phobos was to occur (on April 9-10).4 Nevertheless, Phobos 2 gathered a significant amount of data 
before this failure. This anecdote illustrates the value of generous weight margins on some instruments, the cost of 
negative weight margins on other instruments and on the spacecraft as a whole, the value of redundant spacecraft, 
and the risks of human errors and compound failures. 
Milstar-Milstar is an advanced communications satellite being built for the Department of Defense. A few 
will be built-fewer than originally planned-allowing nonrecurring program costs to be amortized over a few 
satellites. Aside from this economy, Milstar appears to exemplify the antithesis of the fatsat philosophy: it is 
designed to be large in order to cram it with capability, not to reduce its cost. It has had to be redesigned at least 
once to reduce its estimated weight and add margin. Costly edge-of-the-art technologies have been adopted to reduce 
weight, and some are so risky that additional greater-than-expected cost and weight growth could occur. 
Milstar was made fatter to be better, not cheaper, and its gross weight kept growing. A subsystem designer 
quipped, "Milstar is going to gross everybody out. " 
!TRW, briefing. Nov. 16, 1989. See also Science. vol. 199. Feb. 24. 1978. p. 869. and Astrophysical Journal. vol. 230. JlUle 1. 1979. p. 540. 
2Eric J. Lerner. "Mission to Phobos," Aerospace America. September 1988. pp. 34-39. 
3Ibid., and "Phobos 1 Loss to Change Mars Mission." Aviation Week and Space Technology. Oct. 3. 1988. p. 29. 
4"Soviets Lose ContactWith Phobos 2 Spacecraft." Aviation Week and Space Technology. Apr. 3, 1989. p. 22. 
capability, and reliability are reduced, requmng 
expensive weight reduction programs for redress. 
The managers of satellite programs funded by 
line-item appropriations have little incentive to 
spend less than the amount appropriated. When 
funding allows, spacecraft purchasers, with rare 
exceptions, opt to increase performance rather than 
reduce cost. 
Lightsats are satellites that are light enough to be 
launched by small launch vehicles such as a Scout or 
Pegasus, or others now in development. Military 
lightsats could be designed for wartime deployment 
or replenishment from survivable transportable launch-
ers to support theater commanders. Civil lightsats, 
and some military ones, would not require transport-
able launchers; they could be launched by a wider 
variety of launch vehicles, including larger ones. 
The first Soviet and U.S. satellites were lightsats, 
according to this defmition. Explorer I, the first U.S. 
satellite, weighed only 31 lb but collected data that 
led to the discovery of the Van Allen radiation belt. 
But in another sense, the first satellites were fat-as 
heavy as early launch vehicles could launch. As 
larger launch vehicles were developed, larger, more 
capable satellites were developed to ride them. 
Nevertheless, small satellites continue to be 
launched for civil and military applications that 
require only simple functions. 
Interest in lightsats has grown recently, 1 partly in 
anticipation of new rockets designed to launch them 
at low cost, and, in the case of military lightsats, 
because of a desire for a survivable means of 
launching satellites--e.g., transportable launch ve-
hicles too small to launch large satellites.2 
A few years ago the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) began to examine 
lightsats, initially to demonstrate the ability of 
simple and inexpensive satellites to perform simple 
but useful tasks, and, more recently, to demonstrate 
the utility of satellites small enough to be launched 
from transportable launchers to support theater 
commanders during a war. DARPA is considering 
concepts for several types oflightsats-for communica-
tions, navigation, radar mapping, and targeting. The 
Army, Navy, or Air Force may choose to procure 
similar lightsats for operational use. They would be 
designed to be affordable as well as small, because 
many might be needed for replenishment after 
attrition. "With lights at, we can undoubtedly put up 
satellites for less money than it will cost the Soviets 
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Lightsats 
to shoot them down," said Dr. John Mansfield, 
while Director of DARPA's Aerospace and Strate-
gic Technology Office. 3 
SPACECRAFT CONCEPTS 
The first lights at developed by DARPA's Ad-
vanced Satellite Technology Program was a commu-
nications satellite, the Global Low-Orbit Message 
Relay (GLOMR; see figure 4-1). Weighing only 150 
lb, GLOMR was launched by the Space Shuttle on 
October 31, 1985, into a 200-mile-high orbit in-
clined 57 by degrees. 
DARPA has ordered nine more UHF communica-
tion satellites from Defense Systems, Inc., the 
contractor that built the GLOMR. Seven of these, 
called Microsats, will weigh approximately 50 lb 
each. These satellites will be launched together into 
a polar orbit 400 nautical miles high by the Pegasus 
launch vehicle. Once deployed, they will spread out 
around the orbit. They will carry "bent-pipe" radio 
repeaters-i.e., the messages they receive will be 
retransmitted instantaneously to ground stations. 
The other two satellites will be larger "store/ 
foreward" satellites called MACSATs (for Multiple-
Access Communication SATellite). They will weigh 
about 150 lb each and will be launched together on 
a Scout launch vehicle. They will store messages 
received from ground stations and forward (or 
"dump") them when within range of the ground 
stations to which the messages are addressed. The 
bent-pipe satellites and the first store/foreward 
satellites will cost DARPA about $8 million exclud-
ing launch costs. 
Amateur ("ham") radio operators have built a 
series of small satellites carrying radio beacons or 
repeaters, the first of which, OSCAR I, was launched 
in 1961. Since 1969, the nonprofit Radio Amateur 
Satellite Corp. (AMSAT) and its sister organizations 
worldwide4 have built or designed several of these 
for scientific, educational, humanitarian, and recrea-
tional use by hams. AMSAT, which has only one 
paid employee, is now building four 22-pound 
1See• e.g .• A.E. Fuhs and M.R. Mosier. "A Niche for Lightweight Satellites." Aerospace America. April 1988. pp. 14-16 .• and Theresa M. Foley. 
"U.S. Will Increase Lightsat Launch Rate to Demonstrate Military. Scientific Uses." Aviation Week and Space Technology. Sept. 26. 1988. pp. 19-20. 
2There is no consensus on whether this is the best approach to assuring continued mission performance in wartime. 
3Quoted by Jatnes W. Rawles. "LlGHTSAT: All Systems Are Go." Defense Electronics. vol. 20, No.5, May 1988. p. 64 fT. 
4 AMSAT-North America has sister organizations in Argentina. Australia. Brazil, Britain. Germany. Italy. Japan. Mexico. and the Netherlands. The 
Soviet Union has also launched satellites for atnateur radio operators. 
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Figure 4-1-The Global low-Orbit Message Relay 
(GLOMR) Satellite 
SOURCE: Department of Defense. 
(lO-kilogram) communications satellites called Mi-
crosats5 (figure 4-2). (These Microsats are unrelated 
to the above-mentioned Microsats developed for 
DARPA and to the "microspacecraft" discussed in 
the next part of this report.) All four satellites are 
designed to receive, store, and forward digital 
messages using a technique called packet communi-
cations. All four use a standard bus, the Microsat 
bus. One of the satellites, called PACSAT, is being 
built for AMSAT. An almost identical satellite 
called LUSAT is being built for a sister organization, 
AMSAT-LU, in Argentina. A third satellite, nick-
named Webersat, will carry, in addition to its packet 
radio repeater, a low-resolution color TV camera 
designed at the Center for Aerospace Technology at 
Weber State College in Logan, UT. The fourth 
satellite, Digital Orbiting Voice Encoder (DOVE), 
was built for BRAMSAT (AMSAT-Brazil). It will 
carry a digital voice synthesizer to generate voice 
messages that can be received by students using 
inexpensive "scanner" radios.6 
AMSAT contracted with Arianespace to launch 
these four satellites together for $100,000. The 
Ariane 4 launch vehicle will also deploy the 
UoSAT-D and UoSAT-E amateur-radio satellites 
built at the University of Surrey in England in 
addition to the four Microsats and its primary 
payload, the SPOT 2 photomapping satellite.7 The 
launch, originally scheduled for June 1989, has been 
postponed until January 1990, at the earliest. 
Microsats are among the smallest communica-
tions satellites ever built. They are lightsats, because 
they are designed to perform relatively simple 
functions. But they are also fatsats, because they are 
heavier and larger than they would be if built by 
methods usually used for more conventional (and 
more expensive) satellites. Assembly of some Mi-
crosat subsystems is literally a cottage industry. 
Although some printed circuits are being built for 
Microsats by a contractor using high-tech methods, 
others are being built in the homes of Amateur radio 
operators allover the country. When they volunteer 
to assemble printed circuits, AMSAT sends them the 
instructions. 
CONCEPTS FOR PHASED 
ARRAYS OF SPACECRAFT 
Groups of small satellites could collectively 
provide communications or radar capabilities that 
could otherwise be provided only by a large satellite. 
To do so they would have to operate coherently as 
elements of a phased array: all satellites must relay 
the signals they receive to a satellite or ground 
station that can combine them in a way that depends 
on the relative positions of the satellites, which must 
be measured extremely accurately. When transmit-
ting, the satellites must all transmit the same signal, 
SSee courtney Duncan. "The AMSAT-NA Microsats." 73 Amateur Radio. May 1989. pp. 83-84. and Doug Loughmiller and Bob McGwier. 
"Microsat: The Next Generation of OSCAR Satellites-Part 1." QST. May 1989, pp. 37-40. 
6'J'he digital voice synthesizer is similar to the DIGITALKER developed at the University of Surrey in England for use on the UoSAT-OSCAR-9 
and UoSAT- OSCAR-II amateur-radio satellites built there. 
7JeffW. Ward, "Experimental OSCARs," QST, May 1989, p. 62 ff. 
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Figure 4-2-Mlcrosat: A 22-lb Communications satellite for Amateur ("Ham") Radio Operators 
(I) Flight model beside Leonid Labutin. UA3CR. 
(r) Close-up view. (Copyright Radio Amateur Satellite Corp.) 
Photos: Andrew C. MacAllister. WA5ZIB. 
but each satellite must delay its transmission by a 
period that depends on its relative position. 
The Air Force has considered "placing large 
phased arrays in space with major components of the 
arrays not rigidly connected to each other" (see 
figure 4-3), because' 'If we can achieve coherence 
among these components, phased arrays can be 
spread out over very large volumes in space, giving 
them an unprecedented degree of survivability. It 
therefore may be possible to create a phased-array 
device (e.g., a space-based radar) that we can place 
into space and enhance simply by adding more 
relatively inexpensive elements whenever the threat 
increases and budget pressures permit.' '8 If small 
enough, each element could be launched by a small 
launch vehicle. 
If a large radar or communications satellite were 
divided into several modules. "crosslink" equip-
ment for communications among the modules would 
have to be provided, which would add some weight 
and cost. Aside from this, historical cost data 
indicate that a communications mISSIOn payload 
might cost less if divided into several smaller 
payloads of equal aggregate weight and power.9 The 
same might be true of radar equipment. Each module 
would need its own bus, but the cost data also 
indicate that several small busses would probably 
cost less, or no more, than a single bus of equal 
aggregate weight. 1O Learning and production-rate 
effects could make the small modules and busses 
even less expensive. Economies of scale in launch-
ing might make it economical to launch as many as 
possible on a large launch vehicle, but they could be 
launched individually on small launch vehicles if 
desired--e.g., in wartime, if peacetime launch facili-
ties have been damaged. 
Coherent operation of several satellites requires 
relative positions to be measured with errors no 
greater than a fraction of a wavelength of the 
radiation to be sensed or transmitted. The accuracy 
required for coherent operation of several satellites 
as a microwave radar or radiotelescope has already 
been demonstrated. I I Coherent operation of several 
8Headquaners. Air Force Systems Command, Project Forecast II Executive Summary (Andrews Air Force Base, MD: Headquarters, Air Force 
Systems Command, undated). This concept is described in greater detail in the classified final report, AFSC-TR-86-008; see pp. PS-30.01 to PS-30.19 
of Annex D of vol. IV. which authorized readers may request from the Defense Technical Information Center (accession number AD-C039 642). 
9p. Hillebrandt et al .• Space Division Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model Sixth Edition. SD TR-88-97 (Los Angeles AFB. CA: Headquarters. Space 
Systems Division, U.S. Air Force Systems Command. November 1988); distribution limited to U.S. Government agencies only. 
lOibid. 
llM.A. Dornhein. "TORS, Ground Antennas Link for Radio Astronomy Observations," Aviation Week and Space Technology. Dec. 1. 19116. pp. 
32-33. 
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Figure 4-3-Sparse Array of Satellites Could Provide 
Detailed Radar Maps (Artist's Concept) 
SOURCE: U.S. Air Force. 
satellites as a ladar or optical telescope is beyond the 
state of the art. However, someday it may be feasible 
to launch several telescope modules, each smaller 
than the Hubble Space Telescope, and assemble 
them in space (or allow them to assemble them-
selves) into a rigidly connected phased array12 that 
would operate as an optical telescope with better 
light-collecting capability and resolution than the 
Hubble Space Telescope. If technology advances 
further, two or more such arrays, not rigidly con-
nected to one another, could operate coherently to 
further increase light-collecting capability and, es-
pecially, resolution.13 
A scientist at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) 
of the California Institute of Technology (CalTech) 
has proposed a less ambitious phased-array radio-
telescope that could be begun today: an Orbiting 
Low-Frequency Array of 6 or 7 satellites in a 
formation 200 kIn across (see figure 4-4). It could 
map astronomical sources of radio signals with 
wavelengths longer than 15 meters; such signals 
cannot penetrate the Earth's ionosphere to reach 
ground-based radiotelescopes. The angular resolu-
tion of the proposed array could be comparable to 
that of a dish antenna 200 km across. JPL estimates 
that each satellite would cost about $1.5 million and 
weigh less than 90 kg (200 lb) if cy lindrical, or 45 kg 
(100 lb) if spherical.14 They must be launched to a 
circular orbit at least 10,000 kIn high, so the 
equivalent weight to low orbit would be about 170 
lb for the spherical satellite. 
LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS 
Operational launchers for military lightsats must 
meet several requirements, the most distinctive 
being survivability in high-intensity (if not nuclear) 
conflict. Such survivability is required of V.S. 
strategic and theater missile launchers, and opera-
tional lights at launchers might adopt some of their 
features. Like the rail-mobile launcher for the Soviet 
SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the 
similar launcher being developed for V.S. Peacekeeper 
(M-X) ICBMs, and the Hard Mobile Launcher being 
developed for the Small ICBM ("Midgetman"), 
lights at launchers could pursue survivability 
through mobility. They could also employ conceal-
ment, as do the Pershing 2 launcher and submarines 
(e.g. Trident) that launch ballistic missiles. 
Operational military lights at launchers would 
probably be required to launch on short notice and to 
sustain higher launch rates than typical space launch 
facilities do. On the other hand, lightsat launch 
vehicles would be useful with less lift capability than 
most launch vehicles have, although DARPA has 
said the Scout launch vehicle lifts too little to be 
useful as an interim launch vehicle for launching 
developmentallightsats, and the Scout does not have 
the survivability and launch rate desired for wartime 
use. The Pegasus launch vehicle may provide an 
innovative means of improving launch flexibility 
and survivability. 
12Such as the proposed Coherent System of Modular Imaging Collectors (COSMIC) described by the National Research Council in Space Technology 
to Meet Future Needs (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1987), p. 39. 
l3lbid. 
14Tom Kuiper. "Sub-millimeter Waves," in NASNQAST & SDIO/IST, Micro Spacecraft/or Space Science Workshop-presentations. California 
Institute of Tcclmo1ogy Jet Propulsion Laboratory, July 6-7, 1988; pp. 136-142. 
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Figure 4-4-Orblting Low-Frequency Array of Radioastronomy Satellites (Artist's Concept) 
1-"11 .... .--------"." 100 KM ------------II~~I 
SOURCE: California Institute of Technology, Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 
Civil lightsats and developmental military 
lightsats would not require transportable launchers. 
LAUNCH SYSTEM OPTIONS 
Existing Launch Vehicles 
Civil lightsats, or developmental military lightsats. 
could be launched-alone or co-manifested with 
other payloads-on currently operational launch 
vehicles larger than the Scout. If they are small 
enough, they could be launched by the Scout. 
Air-Launched Vehicles 
The communications satellites now being devel-
oped by DARPA are very light; several can be 
launched on the Pegasus air-launched vehicle (ALV). 
The Pegasus ALV is being developed by Orbital 
Sciences Corp. (OSC) and Hercules Aerospace 
Corp. as a $50 million privately funded joint 
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Figure 4-5-Pegasus Launch 
The Pegasus air-launched vehicle is released from a modified B-52 aircraft operated by NASA's Dryden Flight Research Facility (artist's 
concept). 
SOURCE: Orbital Sciences Corp. 
venture. DARPA will pay OSC $6.3 million to 
provide the launch vehicle for a government demon-
stration launch. This price includes neither the cost 
of using NASA's B-52 as an ALV carrier (see figure 
4-5) nor the cost of safety support from the Air 
Force's Western Test Range. Pegasus is expected to 
be able to launch a 335-kg (738-lb) payload into an 
orbit 500 km (270 nmi) high and inclined 25 degrees, 
or a 244-kg (537-lb) payload into a polar orbit 500 
km high (see figure 4-6). 
DARPA originally intended to launch the Micro-
sats on the first Pegasus launch, but has decided to 
launch them on the second launch, perhaps late in 
1989. On its first flight, now scheduled for January 
1990, Pegasus will carry: 
1. a 150-lb Navy communication satellite, 
2. a NASA scientific experiment payload, and 
3. instrumentation to evaluate the performance of 
the ALV. 
DARPA's contract has four launch options re-
maining, and OSC has offered to add six additional 
launch options to the contract. 
OSC and Hercules also expect Pegasus can launch 
lightsats into geostationary orbit; they recently 
signed an agreement with Ball Aerospace to launch 
two BGS-IOO Ball geostationary satellites in late 
1990 or early 1991. OSC estimates each launch will 
, cost between $6 million and $8 million, and that 
each of the satellites, which will weigh about 400 lb 
and carry a 400-watt single-channel transponder, 
will cost between $5 million and $8 million. OSC 
estimates each mission (satellite, launch, and sup-
port) will cost about $20 million. The satellite design 
Chapter 4--Lightsats • 25 
Figure 4-6-Projected Performance of Pegasus: Payload v. Orbital Altitude and Inclination 
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is modular; Ball is developing larger versions with 
more transponders or more power per transponder. IS 
Standard Small Launch Vehicle 
Last year, DARPA issued a Request for Proposals 
to develop a transportable ground-launched Stan-
dard Small Launch Vehicle (SSLV) capable of 
launching 1,000 lb of payload to a polar orbit 400 
nmi high. DARPA recently awarded a contract to 
Space Data Corp. (a subsidiary of OSC) for develop-
ment, one launch (from Vandenberg Air Force Base 
in the fall of 1991), and options for four more. The 
first stage of the vehicle proposed by Space Data 
Corp. will use a solid rocket motor developed for the 
Peacekeeper ICBM by Morton Thiokol. The second, 
third, and fourth stages will be the ftrst, second, and 
third stages of Pegasus, without the wings. OSC is 
Polar orbits 
90· inclination 
also developing a commercial version of the SSLV, 
called Taurus. 
Other small launch vehicles have been developed 
or proposed by companies that performed Phase 1 
SSLV studies for DARPA. Space Services, Inc. 
(SSI) developed a launch vehicle called Conestoga, 
which uses clustered Castor solid rocket motors. The 
ftrst Conestoga was successful on a sub-orbital 
flight, but the second failed shortly after launch on 
November 15, 1989. LTV Aerospace, which pro-
duces the Scout, could produce an upgraded version. 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. proposed a launch 
vehicle that would use the fust- and second-stage 
motors from Poseidon C3 fleet ballistic missiles and 
Morton Thiokol Star 48 motors for the third stage. 
Lockheed estimated that the vehicle could be 
available in two years and could launch a 770-lb 
IS' 'Pegasus, Ball to Launch CommWlication Satellites Into Geosynchronous Orbit," Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 12, 1989, p. 64, and 
Military Space, June 19, 1989, p. 8. 
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payload from a land-based launcher to a 250-mile 
high orbit inclined 28 degrees.16 
Other Options 
The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is 
developing a concept for a sea-launch system to 
launch a partially submerged launch vehicle from a 
platform towed out to sea.17 This system, called 
SEALAR (SEA Launch And Recovery) might 
provide the survivability required by lightsats. 
Sea-launch systems have been tested, to different 
degrees, by the U.S. Navy (Project Hydra), Truax 
Engineering18 (SEA DRAGON, SUBCALffiUR), 
and Starstruck (now American Rocket Co.). DARPA 
is not known to be considering a sea-launch system 
for its Advanced Satellite Technology Program, but 
such a system might prove attractive to the Navy in 
the future. 
Storage, shipment, and mobile basing of small 
launch vehicles could be made safer by using hybrid 
rocket motors-rocket motors that use liquid oxy-
gen to burn solid fuel, which can be inert (nonex-
plosive). American Rocket Co. (AMROC) of Cam-
arillo, CA, has developed a throttleable, restartable, 
70,000-lb thrust hybrid rocket motor, the H-500. On 
its first launch attempt (October 5,1989), the motor 
failed and the prototype sounding rocket it was to 
power collapsed and burned at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, CA. It is noteworthy that it did not 
explode, and did very little damage to the pad. 
The sounding rocket, a prototype of AMROC's 
planned Industrial Research Rocket, carried a pay-
load designed by AMROC for a Strategic Defense 
Initiative experiment and a prototype reentry vehicle 
developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (MIT) Space Systems Laboratory. The reen-
try vehicle was to deploy an umbrella-like structure 
made of space-suit material and decelerate to a soft 
landing in the Pacific Ocean, where it was to be 
recovered. 
AMROC is developing a larger sounding rocket 
and an even larger Industrial Launch Vehicle, the 
largest version of which is being designed to launch 
a 4,000-lb payload into low Earth orbit. AMROC is 
not specifically designing the launch vehicle for 
survivable basing (although this is not precluded) 
and has not entered DARPA's SSLV competition. 
Before the sounding rocket failure, AMROC ex-
pected a first launch late in 1990. 
AMROC is also developing a larger hybrid motor 
for a larger launch vehicle, as well as a smaller 
hybrid motor for various applications, possibly 
including use on projectiles launched from electro-
magnetic launchers (discussed below). 
General Technology Systems (GTS) is develop-
ing a small launch vehicle called LittLEO to launch 
lightsats. It is expected to be able to launch almost 
a tonne (2,200 lb) of payload into a polar orbit 300 
kilometers (162 nautical miles) high. First launch is 
planned for 1992, probahly from Andoya, Norway. 
GTS quotes a price of nine million pounds sterling 
per launch, which is equivalent to roughly $6,400 
per pound to LEO.19 
E'Prlme Aerospace Corp. (EPAC) is developing 
a series of launch vehicles for launching payloads 
weighing from 1,000 to 20,000 lb into LEO and up 
to 8,000 lb into geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). 
EPAC quotes a prices of $12 million per launch for 
the smallest launch vehicle and $80 million for the 
largest.2o EPAC plans to launch from Cape Canav-
eral Air Force Station, FL, and from Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, CA. A first launch is planned for 1992. 
The Soviet Union is developing a launch vehicle 
called "Start" for launching lightsats. Start would 
use guidance and propulsion systems developed for 
the SS-20 ballistic missile and could be launched 
from a mobile launcher, carrying 300-lb payloads to 
orbits 500 km high. Space Commerce Corp., in 
Houston, is seeking customers for Technopribor, 
which is developing Start, and quoting a price of 
about $5 million to $6 million per launch. Tech-
nopribor estimates a test launch could be conducted 
in 1991. 
Lightsats can also be launched as "piggyback" 
payloads on launch vehicles carrying larger primary 
payloads. Many U.S. and foreign launch vehicles 
have done this for years. Arianespace has developed 
16"Lockheed Will Develop Small Military Booster Using Poseidon C3 Hardware," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Sept. 26, 1988, p. 18. 
11NRL, Naval Center for Space Technology, briefing for OTA staff, Feb. 17, 1989. 
18Capt. Roben C. Truax, USN (ret.), "Commercial View on Launch Vehicles," Space Systems Productivity and Manl.ifacturing Conference IV (EI 
Segundo, CA: Aerospace Corp., Aug. 11-12, 1987); pp. 55-69. 
191an Parker, "Getting There Cheaply," Space, vol. 5, No.4, July-August 1989, pp. 45-48. 
lOIbid. 
procedures to do so routinely with the Ariane 4 
launch vehicle, which, as noted above, is scheduled 
to launch six amateur-radio satellites in addition to 
the SPOT 2 photomapping satellite on January 19, 
1990. General Dynamics is planning to offer a 
similar service using its commercial Atlas launch 
vehicle, which could launch, in addition to a primary 
payload, one 3,000-lb satellite or several smaller 
lightsats to LEO, or a 2,000-lb payload to geosta-
tionary transfer orbit.21 This service could be offered 
in late 1991 for about $6,000 per pound to LEO; the 
primary payload owner may reserve the right to 
approve the price offered.22 
Someday, small lightsats might be launched on 
laser-powered rockets (discussed below). Lightsats 
could also be launched on vehicles proposed for 
launching larger payloads or crews-e.g., the Ad-
vanced Launch System, the Advanced Manned 
Launch System, and NASP-derived vehicles.23 Of 
these, only National Aero-Space Plane (NASP)-
derived vehicles (NDVs) are intended to provide a 
survivable capability for wartime launch. 
ISSUES 
Are lightsats the most economical answer to the 
problem of satellite vulnerability? Replenishing 
satellites in wartime is only one of several partial 
solutions; others include hardening satellites and 
stockpiling spare satellites in orbit during peace-
time,24 as well as arms control, actively defending 
satellites, and reducing reliance on satellites for 
support of military operations.25 
What military requirements could lightsats sat-
isfy? An Air Force officer responsible for space 
system planning said, "The challenge to the small 
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satellite community has been to get out of the mold 
of a solution looking for a problem; that is, what 
missions will a small satellite support. "26 According 
to the previous Secretary of the Air Force, "The 
decision on whether a system is 'small' depends on 
such things as orbit, mission, requirements, and 
technology capabilities. When these factors properly 
converge, we have built Smallsats . . . . What we 
want are a realistic set of requirements and concepts 
for smaller systems.' '27 Several concepts have 
already been proposed, the most grandiose of which 
are being considered by the Strategic Defense 
Initiati ve Organization: "Brilliant Pebbles" orlarger 
space-based missile interceptors, "Brilliant Eyes" 
(space-based space-surveillance satellites that would 
demonstrate Brilliant Pebbles technology-see box 
4-A), decoys for Brilliant Pebbles, and "Small 
Dumb Boosters" (orbital transfer stages with which 
Brilliant Pebbles could rendezvous and mate). 
Could lights at technology and launch vehicles 
benefit civil applications? They already have. For 
example, for two decades amateur radio operators 
have built and used lightsats for recreational, educa-
tional, and public-service communications. Con-
ceivably, networks of tens or hundreds of lightsats 
could provide continuous global communications or 
navigation services commercially. There is some 
commercial interest in concepts. that would require 
only a few lightsats.28 29 
Since Sputnik I and Explorer I, science has 
benefitted from lightsats and will continue to 
benefit-more so if launch costs are reduced. 
Medium-sized multi-mission remote-sensing satel-
lites have used some instruments, such as the 
Scanning Multichannel Microwave Radiometer on 
Seasat-l,30 that are light enough to be mated to a 
21Th reach geostationary orbit (GEO) from geostationary transfer orbit (GTO). the payload must have an orbital transfer stage. 
22Ian Parker. op. cit .. footnote 19. 
23See U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Round Trip to Orbit: Human Space !light Alternatives. OTA-ISC-419 (Washington. DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. August 1989). 
24See. for example. the speech that the Honorable Edward C. Aldridge. Jr .. Secretary ofthe Air Force. prepared for a luncheon at the Aviation Club. 
Crystal City. VA. Sept. 15. 1988. and Col. Charles Heimach. USAF. Speech to Second Annual AIAMJSU Conference on Small Satellites. Utah State 
University. Logan. UT, September 1988. 
25See U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Antisatellite Weapons. Countermeasures, and Arms Control. OTA-ISC-281 (Washington. 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. September 1985); reprinted in Office of Technology Assessment. Strategic Defenses (Princeton. NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 1986). 
26Col. Charles Heirnach. USAF. op. cit .. footnote 24. 
27Hon. Edward C. Aldridge. Jr .. op. cit .. footnote 24. 
28Fuhs and Mosier. op. cit.. footnote 1. 
29'fhe Center for Innovative Technology of the Commonwealth of Virginia has commissioned economists at George Mason University to assess 
potential markets for small satellites. This study is nearing completion. 
30A.R. Hibbs and W.S. Wilson. "Satellites Map the Oceans." IEEE Spectrum. October 1983. pp. 46-53. 
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Box 4-A-Brilliant Eyes? 
Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing a new class of electronic high-resolution 
wide-angle TV cameras that, from an altitude of 1,000 km (610 mi), could image a land area the size of the state 
of Virginia and show individual buildings. The first prototype camera, completed in 1987, has optics that are about 
1 ft in diameter and 16 in long, excluding electronics. With improved electro-optical components, its resolution 
would be comparable to or slightly better than that of the French SPOT satellite (about 10 m) from:. a comparable 
altitude (832 km). At a lower altitude it could show greater detail but would have a smaller field of view. On Earth, 
it could be used as a telescopic TV camera to record the tracks of meteors and low-altitude satellites against the 
SPOT Imagery of the Pentagon and 
the White House 
Lightsats Could Produce Comparable Imagery 
night-time sky. 
SOURCE: U.S. Geodetic Survey. 
LLNL has also developed a preliminary 
design for a miniature version of this camera 
compact enough for use as a satellite naviga-
tion system. The system is designed to get 
periodic position updates by viewing many 
stars at the same time. The total mass of the 
system is expected to be less than 250 grams 
(about half a pound). LLNL expects that "this 
[wide-field-of-view] system, with its combi-
nation of high resolution and high light collec-
tion capability, will also find applications in 
robot vision and smart munitions. "I 
ILLNL. EfU!rgy and Technology Review. July-August 1988. pp. 88-89. 
lights at bus to become a lights at for meteorology and 
oceanography. Arrays of lightsats could someday 
use interferometric (phased-array) and aperture-
synthesis techniques to provide high-resolution 
radar or microwave imagery for Earth-resources 
mapping or "mediasat" applications.3! This might 
be more economical than using a large, monolithic 
satellite; predicting an arrays' relative economy 
would require comparing cost estimates based on 
detailed designs. 
31See U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Commercial Newsgathering From Space. OTA-TM-ISC-40 (Springfield. VA: National 
Technical Information Service. May 1987). 
Microspacecraft would be satellites or deep-space 
probes weighing no more than about 10 kilograms 
(22 pounds).l Tens or hundreds could be used to 
measure magnetism, gravity, or solar wind at widely 
separated points simultaneously. A swarm of differ-
ent microspacecraft could obtain detailed radio 
images of galaxies, while others could be used for 
communications, gamma-ray astronomy, or plane-
tary photoreconnaissance. 
They would not require development of new 
launch systems; they could be launched like buck-
shot on existing small launch vehicles. However, if 
there were a demand for launching thousands per 
year, it might be cheaper to launch them on 
laser-powered rockets (see figure 5-1), if these prove 
feasible. 
Extremely rugged microspacecraft, constructed 
like the Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile 
(LEAP) being developed for the Strategic Defense 
Initiative,2 could be launched to orbit by an electro-
magnetic launcher (railgun or coilgun) or a ram 
cannon. An electromagnetic launcher in orbit could 
launch them toward outer planets at muzzle veloci-
ties that would allow them to reach their destinations 
and return data to Earth within a few years. This 
might allow a graduate student to design a mission 
and then receive mission data in time to use it in a 
Ph.D. dissertation. 
SPACECRAFT CONCEPTS 
Several concepts for microspacecraft have been 
proposed. One example is the Mars Observer 
Camera (MOC) microspacecraft proposed by the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory at the California Institute of 
Technology (CalTech). It would be a generic imag-
ing microspacecraft; dozens could be launched on 
each of several missions-to the Moon, the planets, 
their moons, cornets, and asteroids. A MOC micro-
spacecraft would be shaped like an oversized hockey 
puck, about 15 centimeters (cm) in diameter and 4 
cm thick (see figure 5-2). It would weigh about 800 
grams (g). A version could be designed to withstand 
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the accelerations to which electromagnetic launch 
would subject them. 
Placed in different orbits or trajectories, they 
could trade off field of 'View for resolution, or vice 
versa For example, one MOC microspacecraft in a 
polar orbit about Mars could serve as a Martian 
weather satellite, providing two-color images with a 
resolution of 5 to 10 kilometers (km)-sufficient to 
resolve Martian clouds. A similar MOC micros pace-
craft in a lower orbit could serve as a mapper, 
providing two-color images of a smaller field of 
view with better resolution-l00 meters (m). In time 
it could map the entire planet. A similar MOC 
microspacecraft in an even lower orbit about the 
Moon could provide a two-color global map of the 
Moon with 10m resolution. Existing global maps of 
the Moon currently show no features smaller than 
several hundred meters. 
LAUNCH SYSTEM OPTIONS 
New, specialized launch systems need not be 
developed to launch microspacecraft, because they 
could be launched on existing launch vehicles-by 
the dozens, if appropriate. However, some proposed 
unconventional launch systems might prove to be 
better or cheaper than conventional launch vehicles 
for launching microspacecraft. 
One example of such a system is a laser-powered 
rocket that would use a laser beam, instead of 
combustion, to heat the propellant, which could be 
inert (Le., nonreactive). If feasibility is proven, a 
lO-megawatt (MW) laser may be able to launch a 
I-kg payload of one or more micro spacecraft; a 
gigawatt laser might launch a I-tonne (t) payload 
consisting of several microspacecraft or a larger 
spacecraft. 
The smallness of microspacecraft has another 
potential advantage: some microspacecraft could be 
built to withstand high accelerations comparable to 
those endured by cannon-launched guided projec-
tiles such as Copperhead.3 Such "g-hardened" 
lSee Ross M. Jones. "Coffee-can-sized spacecraft." Aerospace Am£rica. October 1988. pp. 36-38. and "Think small-in large nwnbers," 
Aerospace America. October 1989. pp. 14-17. 
2See U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. SDJ: Technology. Survivability, and Software, OTA-ISC-353 (Washington. DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, May 1988). pp. 120-121. 
3The U.S. Army's M712 Copperhead cannon-launched guided projectile is an artillery shell fired from a 155mm howitzer. It has a sensor and 
electronics for detecting a spot of laser light on a target illwninated by a low-power, pulse-coded, target-designating laser aimed by a soldier or pilot. 
When Copperhead detects such a spot. it steers toward it using fins deployed after launch. Copperhead rounds cost about $35,000 each. 
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Figure 5-1-Laser-Powered Rockets 
Pitch-over 
Ascent 
_-1~~====Fairing (nose cone) 
Base plate 
----Propellant (plastic, ice, or metal) 
_---Laser beam 
~. ____ Laser (notional) 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989. 
microspacecraft could be launched by "direct 
launch" systems4 such as railguns,5 coilguns,6 and 
Orbital 
insertion 
A simple laser-powered rocket would have four parts: the 
propellant (a block of plastic, metal, or ice), the payload, 
the payload fairing (nose cone), and a base plate to which 
the propellant is bonded and the payload and fairing are 
attached. A large laser built on a mountain would beam 
power to the rocket, vaporizing the propellant and 
thereby producing thrust perpendicular to the surface of 
the propellant. 
The figure at left illustrates operation of the system 
shortly after launch, when the rocket ascends vertically. 
After the rocket rises above the densest part of the 
atmosphere, the laser beam would be aimed off-center to 
produce thrust asymmetrically, causing the rocket to pitch 
(tilt) over, as shown above left. The rocket then begins to 
accelerate downrange while ascending. When the rocket 
reaches orbital altitude, it continues to accelerate 
horizontally, as shown above, until orbital velocity is 
attained. 
ram cannons.7 In the near term, microspacecraft 
could be launched by chemical rockets, such as 
4S0 called because the projectiles, which would enclose and protect the microspacecraft (or a mission payload), would require no further propulsion 
after they leave the muzzle of the launch system, if launched into solar orbit or an interplanetary trajectory. A projectile would require a small rocket 
motor or some other kind of motor to enter Earth orbit. 
SMiles R. Palmer and Ali E. Dabiri, "Electromagnetic Space Launch: A Re-Evaluation in Light of Current Technology and Launch Needs and 
Feasibility of a Near-Term Demonstration," IEEE Transactions on Magnetics, vol. MAG-25, No. I, January 1989, p. 393ff. 
6Henry Kolm and Peter Mongeau, "Basic Principles of Coaxial Launch Teclmology ," IEEE Transactions on Magnetics, vol. MAG-20, No.2, March 
1984, pp. 227-230. 
7A.P. Bruckner and A. Henzberg, "A Ram Accelerator System for Direct Launch of Space Cargo," Paper No.IAF-87-211, presented at the 38th 
Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Brighton, England, Oct 10-17,1987. 
Figure 5-2-Mars Observer Camera Mlcrospacecraft 
Design Cutaway View-Actual Size 
SOURCE: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1988. 
Scout and Pegasus, that are designed to launch 
payloads of a few hundred kilograms for a fraction 
of the cost of launching them on larger launch 
vehicles. 
In the remainder of this section we focus on 
unconventional launch technologies. A surprisingly 
large number of them have been proposed; one 
recent review8 lists 60 propulsion technologies-in 
addition to conventional chemical rocket technology-
that are potentially applicable to space transporta-
tion. About half are applicable to Earth-to-orbit 
transportation; most are applicable to in-space 
transportation (e.g., orbital transfer or escape), 
which demands less thrust and power than does 
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Earth-to-orbit transportation. For brevity, we discuss 
only two unconventional launch technologies here: 
railguns and two-pulse laser-supported-detonation 
(LSD) thrusters, which are the simplest of several 
proposed laser-powered rockets. We discuss only 
their application to Earth-to-orbit transportation 
here, although both are also applicable to in-space 
transportation.9 In fact, orbital transfer or reboost of 
low-altitude satellites could be done with much 
smaller lasers than would be required for launching 
projectiles from Earth to orbit. lO 
Direct launch systems would subject payloads to 
high accelerations. For a specified muzzle velocity, 
the barrel length of any type of direct-launch system 
must grow as the reciprocal of acceleration. To 
achieve a muzzle velocity of 8 kilometers per second 
with an acceleration of 1,000 gs,ll a direct-launch 
system must have a barrel more than 3 km long. It 
would be impractical for a launcher to be much 
longer, or to subject a payload to correspondingly 
lower acceleration. 
To launch a projectile vertically at an acceleration 
of 1,000 gs, the projectile must be subjected to a 
force 1,001 times its weight. 12 Hence exotic design, 
fabrication, and testing processes are required-
especially for electronic and optical components-
and there are constraints on the shape of the 
projectile, and, in practice, limits on its size. 
Proposed projectiles have weights ranging from a 
few kilograms to a tonne. They could carry payloads 
such as fuel, food, water, structural components for 
space assembly, and specially designed electronic 
and optical systems such as those used in the Army's 
Copperhead cannon-launched guided projectile and 
SADARM cannon-launched sensor-fuzed weapon, 
and the Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile 
being developed for the SOL 
8Dani Eder, "Technological Progress and Space Development," draft, Apr. 30,1989. 
9See, e.g., Ross M. Jones, "Electromagnetically Launched Micro Spacecraft for Space Science Missions," AIAA paper 88-0068, Jan. 11, 1988, and 
Arthur Kantrowitz, "Laser Propulsion to Earth Orbit: Has Its Time Come?" J.T. Kare (ed.). Proceedings SDIOIDARPA Workshop on Laser Propulsion, 
CONF-860778 (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, July 7-18, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 1-12. 
IOKantrowitz,op. cit., footnote 9, and P.K. Chapman, "Strategic Defense Applications of Ground-Based Laser Propulsion," J.T. Kare (ed.), op. cit., 
footnote 9. 
liThe g (not to be confused with the gram, which is also abbreviated as "g' ') is a unit of acceleration. At an acceleration of 1 g, an object's velocity 
increases by 9.8 m (32 ft) per second per second. 
121f a projectile near the ground were dropped. i.e., subjected to no force, it would accelerate downward; its downward velocity would increase by 
9.8 m per second each second. If sitting on the ground, it would be subjected to a force equal to its weight; this keeps it from falling into the ground-it 
accelerates at zero gs. If subjected to a force twice its weight. it would accelerate upward at 9.8 m per second per second. If subjected to a force thrice 
its weight, it would accelerate upward at 19.6 m per second per second, and so on. 
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In a previous report, OTA described two proposed 
direct launch systems: ram cannons and coilguns. I3 
Coilguns could have important advantages over 
railguns, which are simpler and more familiar 
electromagnetic launchers (EMLs). For example, 
coilguns can be designed so that the projectile does 
not contact the barrel, avoiding barrel erosion, and 
they can be scaled to launch large masses efficiently 
at high velocities. Until recently, railguns were 
expected to be very inefficient at launching multi-
kilogram projectiles at the muzzle velocities (more 
than eight kilometers per second) required to reach 
orbit with minimal assistance from rockets. Low 
efficiency would cause barrel heating and melting, 
as well as a high electric bill. However, in recent 
tests, railguns demonstrated unexpectedly high effi-
ciencies in accelerating small projectiles to muzzle 
velocities of 3 to 4 km per second,I4 raising hopes 
that they might be able to accelerate half-tonne 
projectiles to more than 8 km per second. 
Another cause for increased interest in railguns 
for direct launch is the realization that ordinary 
automobile batteries could be used for energy 
storage and would cost much less than alternatives 
previously considered. Automobile batteries could 
also power coilguns. 
The Air Force recently decided to demonstrate 
suborbital launching of a microspacecraft using a 
railgun at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, after 
augmenting its battery power system and adding a 
barrel with a 30-cm bore, similar to one used 
recently at Maxwell Laboratories. According to one 
estimate, the upgraded gun could launch 5 to 10 kg 
at 4 km per second three years from program start for 
only about $10 million. A I-kg projectile launched 
at 3 km per second with a I-kg sabot is expected to 
reach an altitude of 200 km if the projectile's nosetip 
is allowed to ablate, or 400 km if the nosetip is 
cooled by transpiration. IS 
Proponents predict that a prototype operational 
EML capable of launching 500-kg projectiles each 
carrying about 250 kg of pay load could be developed 
in about six more years for an additional $900 
million to $6 billion, including $50 million to $5 
billion for development of vehicles and tracking 
technology.I617 
If produced and launched at a rate of 10,000 per 
year, projectiles (less payloads) would cost as little 
as $1,000 per kg according to one estimate, but over 
60 times this, according to another estimate. An 
EML projectile would require (besides its mission 
payload) guidance, navigation, and control systems, 
as well as a rocket kick motor to inject it into Earth 
orbit. I8 Just as allowing a payload of specified 
function to be larger allows it to be cheaper, 
miniaturizing it makes it more costly, and g-
hardening it would make it still more costly. On the 
other hand, if a mission required many projectiles, 
high-rate production and learning effects could 
reduce unit costs. Other launch costs might be as low 
as $50 per kg at this rate. 
If batteries are used, the limit would be about 
10,000 launches (2,500 t) per year. 19 Because of the 
brief launch windows for rendezvous, very little of 
this tonnage could go to a space station,20 but most 
or all could be used for other applications, e.g., 
distributed low-altitude networks of tiny satellites 
for communications, space surveillance, ballistic-
missile defense, or space defense. 
If the payload were reduced and the projectiles' 
chemical rockets enlarged, the projectile would have 
more cross-range capability; the launch windows for 
rendezvous with a space station would be longer, 
and more payload could be delivered to a space 
station per year. However, the launch cost per pound 
would increase. Chemical rockets could also be used 
to reduce the muzzle velocity required, so that a 
13U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 1988), p. 50. 
14Miles R. Palmer, "Electromagnetic Space Launch," SA88091 (Mclean, VA: Science Applications International Corp., May 6, 1988). 
15Ibid. 
16Ibid. 
17Miles R. Palmer, personal communication, Oct. 12, 1989. 
18A space probe bound for solar orbit or a fly-by of another planet would not require this. 
19 A greater launch rate could be achieved at greater cost if batteries are not used. 
20palmer and Dabiri, op. cit., footnote S. 
smaller21 or more conventional22 direct-launch sys-
tem could be used. 
Laser propulsion would have important advan-
tages over direct launch. Acceleration would be 
much lower-about 6 or 7 gs on typical trajectories 
to low orbit-so payloads would not have to be 
designed to withstand gun-like stresses. Moreover, 
no expensive device to store and quickly discharge 
gigajoules of energy would be required, as it would 
be for a railgun or coilgun, because power would be 
beamed to a rocket continuously during ascent. 
Perhaps the most important advantage of laser 
propulsion is that a simple laser-powered rocket, 
unlike an EML projectile, would not require guid-
ance, navigation, and control systems, or a separate 
kick motor for injection into orbit 
But laser propulsion would require a powerful, 
expensive laser and a large, expensive adaptive 
mirror. For efficient utilization and low average cost 
per launch, both must operate reliably without 
maintenance for longer periods than do existing 
lasers. And laser launch operations would be halted 
by overcast that would not impede direct launch. 
Moreover, laser propulsion technology is less devel-
oped than EML technology and is predicated on 
unproven theories of thermal blooming suppression 
and thruster plasmadynamics. Validation of these 
theories may require construction of a full-scale 
launch system. 
An SOlO official has estimated that a 20-MW 
carbon-dioxide laser with a 10m-diameter beam 
director telescope could launch rockets carrying 20 
kg of payload for an incremental cost of about $120 
per lb, assuming the laser efficiency is 15 percent, 
the rocket efficiency is 40 percent, electricity can be 
generated for four cents per kilowatt-hour, and the 
structure and propellant each cost about as much as 
the electricity. According to the SOlO, the 2m-
diameter rocket structure would weigh only a few kg 
and would require only about 120 to 150 kg of inert 
propellant such as ice or polyformaldehyde plastic; 
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launching would require 30 to 40 megawatt-hours 
(MW -h) of electric power. 23 
If the system could operate continuously without 
downtime for maintenance or overcast, the launch 
rate could be almost 60,000 per year. In practice, 
occasional overcast would make full utilization 
unachievable, and approaching it would probably 
require at least two lasers and mirrors, so that one 
pair could operate while the other is being serviced. 
Even this would not assure operation most of the 
time, unless the duty cycle of the lasers (i.e., the 
fraction of time they are lasing) is much greater than 
the duty cycles demonstrated by industrial and other 
high-power lasers (see box 5-A). However, if a 
launch rate of 100 per day could be maintained, over 
1,600,000 pounds of payload could be launched into 
orbit each year. This would be almost twice the 
estimated combined capability of current U.S. space 
launch systems,24 almost three times the annual 
tonnage launched in 1984 and 1985, and about four 
times the annual tonnage launched from 1980 to 
1985.25 
The SOlO postulates that, in practice, 100 pay-
loads could be launched per day, on the average, and 
the average cost could be as low as about $200 per 
pound, if capital cost (table 5-1) were depreciated 
over 5 years and if annual operating cost (excluding 
rocket cost) were comparable to the annualized 
capital cost of $90 million. The SDIO estimates that 
launching only one or two payloads a day (500 per 
year) would be sufficient to reduce average cost to 
about $4,500 per pound and make laser-powered 
rockets competitive with conventional rockets for 
small payloads. Some users might be willing to pay 
a premium for the speed with which a laser-powered 
rocket could be prepared to launch a payload. 
The SOlO estimates that a first launch to orbit 
could be attempted about 5 or 6 years after program 
start and expects to demonstrate a rocket efficiency 
of 20 percent or more in experiments now being 
planned. However, the highest efficiency demon-
21Palmer and Dabiri, op. cit., footnote 5, and Henry Kohn and Peter Mongeau, .. An Alternative Launching Medium," IEEE Spectrum, vol. 19, No. 
4, April 1982, pp. 30-36. 
22Large cannons have been used to launch suborbital projectiles and sounding rockets to altitudes of 400,000 feet; see C.H. Murphy and O. V. Bull, 
.. A Review of Project HARP," Anflills of the New York Academy of Science, vol. 140, No. I, 1966, pp. 337-357, and R.O. V. Bull and Charles Murphy, 
Paris Cannoneft-The Paris Guns and Project HARP (Springer-Verlag, November 1988). 
23Jordin T. Kare, "Pulsed Laser Propulsion for Low Cost, High Volume Launch to Orbit," preprint UCRL-I01139, Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, Livermore, CA, June 2, 1989. A different launch simulation program (Kantrowitz, op. cit., footnote 9.) predicts each launch would require 
about nine minutes (hence about 20 MW -h of electric power) and about 200 kg of propellant. 
240TA, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide. op. cit., fooUlote 13, p. 20. 
2Slbid., p. 5. 
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Box 5-A-Lasers for Rocket Propulsion: The State of the Art 
A laser-powered rocket would use a laser beam, instead of combustion, to heat the propellant, which could be inert 
(i.e., noncombustible). The beam could come from a ground-based laser; the rocket could be extremely simple and weigh 
only to times its payload. For comparison, the Scout launch vehicle weighs 1,300 times its payload. 
Studies of Earth-to-orbit laser propulsion postulate the use of infrared lasers, which could be carbon-dioxide or 
deuterium-fluoride electric-discharge lasers or free-electron lasers. The most mature of these is the carbon-dioxide 
electric-discharge laser, but free-electron lasers are more efficient. If a carbon-dioxide laser or a free-electron laser 
operating at the same wavelength (0.01 mm) were used, the economical laser power would be about 1 megawatt (MW: 
1 million watts) per kilogram (kg) of payload, if the laser-powered rockets can achieve the 40-percent energy-conversion 
efficiency once predicted by laser-propulsion proponents. To date, only to-percent efficiency has been achieved. 
Laser-propulsion experts now predict that at least 20-percent efficiency can been achieved. At this efficiency, a laser power 
of about 25 MW might be required to launch a 20-kg payload. If, pessimistically, no more than to-percent efficiency is 
achieved, about 50 MW might be required to launch a 20-kg payload. 
It appears to be feasible to build such a laser; the U.S. has built a gigawatt (billion-watt) free-electron maser and 
electric-discharge lasers of much greater peak power, but none that could produce even to MW average power for ten 
minutes, the boost duration required to reach low orbit. Almost a decade ago, the Antares carbon-dioxide electric-discharge 
laser at the Los Alamos National Laboratory produced brief pulses with a peak power of 40 terawatts (40 trillion watts). 
But a very different design, similar to that of industrial lasers used for welding, would be required for prolonged operation 
at high average power. Free-electron lasers have, to date, produced less peak power. A free-electron laser developed by 
Los Alamos and Boeing has produced pulses of ten megawatts peak power, but only six kilowatts average power, at a 
wavelength of 0.01 mm. In early experiments, the partially completed Paladin free-electron laser at the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory amplified five-megawatt pulses from a carbon-dioxide laser 500-fold, presumably 
producing pulses of about 2.5 gigawatts peak power. The carbon-dioxide laser power is being increased to a gigawatt, and 
the free-electron laser has now been extended. If its electron accelerator operates at the average power for which it was 
designed (at least 25 megawatts), and if 40 percent of the electron-beam power is converted to laser beam power 
(comparable to the efficiency demonstrated by a similar free-electron laser at a wavelength of 8.8 mm), the Paladin 
free-electron laser would produce a laser beam of at least to megawatts average power. ' 
Neither carbon-dioxide lasers nor free-electron lasers have demonstrated the duty cycle (the fraction of time a device 
operates) that would be required for an operational launch system. The duty cycle of a free-electron laser designed for a 
high duty cycle would be limited primarily by the lifetime of the cathode used by the electron accelerator. Loosely 
speaking, the cathode is like the mament of a light bulb, and more closely resembles the cathode of a cathode-ray tube such 
as a TV picture tube. Several cathodes designed for long life are being tested. Alternatively, an electron storage ring (an 
arrangement of magnets) could be used to recirculate the electron beam, as was done in the first free-electron laser and 
others. 
Focusing a multimegawatt laser beam on a small rocket hundreds of kilometers away is another serious technological 
problem; in particular, control of beam-degrading nonlinear optical effects, such as thermal blooming, has not yet been 
demonstrated at any average power and beam diameter of interest. Some research sponsored by the Strategic Defense 
Initiative Organization (SDIO) is aimed at demonstrating high-power beam control for ballistic missile defense; the beam 
control required for propulsion would be more difficult in some respects. 
Nevertheless, participants at a 1986 workshop on laser propulsion sponsored by smo and the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency expressed optimism that a free-electron laser and beam director then planned for other purposes 
"should be capable oflaunching test payloads to low [Earth] orbit in the early 1990s." smo subsequently established 
a laser propulsion program and considered using a free-electron laser and a beam director to be developed for the SDI 
Free-Electron Laser Technology Integration Experiment (FEL TIE) to experiment with laser propulsion, even though the 
FEL TIE laser would be designed to operate at a wavelength shorter than optimal for laser propulsion. 
Subsequent budget cutbacks postponed by at least two or three years the date by which the FEL TIE laser and beam 
director could be operating. More recently, smo decided the FEL TIE laser should use a radio-frequency linear accelerator 
(RF linac) similar to the one developed for the Los Alamos-Boeing free-electron laser instead of an induction linac similar 
to the one used in the Paladin free-electron laser. The Los Alamos-Boeing RF linac produced an electron beam of higher 
quality than that produced by the induction linac used by the Paladin laser; however, use of an RF linac may cause the 
FEL-TIE laser to produce laser pulses with a waveform that is far from optimal for laser propulsion. This, together with 
the nonoptimality of the FEL TIE wavelength, may lead smo to abandon hope of using the FEL TIE laser for laser 
propulsion experiments and force smo, perhaps teamed with other sponsors, to develop a laser and beam director 
specifically for laser propulsion experiments. 
Table 5-1-Estlrnated Cost of a 2G-Megawatt Laser 
for Powering Rockets 
Development .............................. $ 75 million 
Laser ................................... $185 mllllona 
Telescope ............................... $100 million 
Adaptive optics ........................... $ 15 million 
Tracking ................................ $ 50 million 
Power plant .............................. $ 50 million 
Structure ................................ $ 50 million 
Total capital cost ........................... $450 million 
Total nonrecurring cost ., .................. $525 million 
BEstimated as $25 million + $8 per watt. 
SOURCE: Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. 
strated to date is about 10 percent. If only 10 or 20 
percent efficiency could be attained, an 80- or 
4O-megawatt laser would be needed, and average 
cost per pound would be greater than indicated 
above. If the cost of the power plant increases in 
proportion to its power, average cost would be about 
$490 or $275 per pound for 10 or 20 percent rocket 
effIciency, respectively, at a launch rate of 100 per 
day.26 
Because of the brief launch windows for rendez-
vous only 2 payloads per day could be launched 
directly to a rendezvous with the space station. 
Payloads launched at other times would take longer 
and require more fuel to rendezvous.27 The SDIO 
considers 8 payloads per day to be a conservative 
estimate of the number of payloads that could be 
launched to rendezvous with the space station each 
day. With additional investment, the laser and 
rockets could be given more crossrange capability. 
This could be done by making the beam director and 
rockets larger or by adding a conventional chemical 
rocket to the laser-powered rocket. 
ISSUES 
What could microspacecraft do that conventional 
spacecraft couldn't? The consensus of the NASN 
SDIO Microspacecrafi for Space Science Workshop 
Panel28 was that: 
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There is a class of science and exploration 
missions that can be enabled by microspacecraft 
[Le., infeasible with larger spacecraft]. This class of 
missions requires many simultaneous measurements 
displaced in position .... Examples ... include: 1) 
a global network of surface or atmospheric sensors 
on planets such as Mars ... , 2) measuring the spatial 
and temporal structure of magnetospheres about the 
Earth, Sun, or other regions of space, and 3) using 
microspacecraft as distributed arrays for either mdio 
or optical signals. 
They would have another advantage: they could 
be launched from Earth orbit toward outer planets 
by space-based electromagnetic launchers (railguns 
or coilguns) at muzzle velocities that would allow 
them to reach their destinations and return data to 
Earth years earlier than could spacecraft launched by 
conventional rockets. This would accelerate the 
cycle of acquiring knowledge. 
What is the market for such services? How much 
is now spent on conventional spacecraft for space 
science which microspacecraft could do? The 1988 
NASA budget was about $9 billion, of which about 
$1.6 billion was for "space science and applica-
tions."29 30 Much of this is for NASA's "great 
observatories," such as the Hubble Space Telescope 
and the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility, and 
for planetary probes such as Galileo. The consensus 
of the NASNSDIO Microspacecraft for Space 
Science Workshop Panel was that: 
Microspacecraft cannot achieve the science objec-
tives of the great observatory missions such as the 
Hubble Space Telescope or the Advanced X-my 
Astrophysics Facility. Also, intensive, multi-faceted 
science investigations such as those of Galileo at 
Jupiter cannot be supported by the microspacecraft 
concept .... many space science missions will have 
to continue to use established technology. Micro-
spacecraft, if they are to be used in deep-space 
missions, must establish a new inheritance chain, for 
example by being used in near-Earth scientific or 
non-scientific missions. 
26Calculated by OTA using the laWlch simulation program of Kantrowitz. op. cit., footnote 9. The laWlch simulation program used by Kare, 
"Trajectory Simulation for Laser LaWlching," Kare. op. cit. (footnote 10), pp. 61-77, predicts a 50 to 100 percent longer ascent than does Kantrowitz's 
program (for the case of 40 percent thruster efficiency) and hence 50 to 100 percent higher electric power usage and incremental cost. 
27See P.K. Chapman. op. cit .• footnote 10. 
28NASNOAST & SDIO/lST, Microspacecraftfor Space Science Workshop-Report of the Workshop Panel, California Institute of Technology Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, Oct. 6, 1988. 
29U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The NASA Program in the 1990' s and Beyond (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, May 
1988); figure 1; see also figure 4 and box 3. 
3Cl'fhe Department of Defense space program also includes some focused space science projects. 
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An EML, ram cannon, or laser (to power rockets) 
may permit microspacecraft to be launched from 
Earth to orbit at low average cost, but only if utilized 
efficiently. Maximum efficiency would require launch-
ing on the order of 10,000 microspacecraft per year. 
How much would these microspacecraftcost? Could 
space science budgets pay for so many microspace-
craft? If not, what other types of microspacecraft 
might be launched by such a system to maintain an 
efficient launch rate? 
Possibilities inc1ude:31 
• low-altitude comsat networks (civil or mili-
tary); 
• "Brilliant Eyes, " "Brilliant Pebbles," or "Small 
Dumb Boosters" for a strategic defense sys-
tem;32 
• logistics for a space station or other space 
operations. Payloads could include structural 
components, fuel, armor, etc.; and 
• intercontinental artillery. 
The utility of these applications has not been 
established. All require further analysis before they 
can be used to justify developing a direct-launch 
system or a laser and laser-powered rockets. Some 
proposed logistics schemes appear more promising 
than others. For example. it is probably feasible to 
launch Small Dumb Boosters (orbital transfer stages) 
with which Brilliant Pebbles could rendezvous and 
mate. Some have proposed launching projectiles 
loaded with water, liquid oxygen, and liquid hydro-
31Mi1es R. Palmer, op. cit. footnote 14. 
gen toward the Space Station Freedom, but the costs 
of collecting and decanting them have not yet been 
estimated. 
The risk of satellite collisions would increase 
greatly if tens of thousands of microspacecraft were 
placed in orbit, unless a means of collision warning 
and avoidance is developed. Existing space surveil-
lance systems may be inadequate for tracking tens of 
thousands of microspacecraft. although Brilliant 
Eyes or Brilliant Pebbles could help with this. 
Ground-based lasers could be used to change the 
orbits of satellites equipped with slabs of inert 
propellant, whether launched by laser or not.33 
However, this may not be adequate for collision 
avoidance, because such satellites may pass over 
propulsion lasers only infrequently, so advanced 
warning of a collision hazard would be required, but 
might be costly and subject to false alarms. 
Brilliant Pebbles would not require advanced 
warning of a collision; they could be programmed to 
avert collisions by dodging approaching spacecraft. 
They could also be commanded to ram a nonmaneu-
verable satellite (e.g., a failed Brilliant Pebble) that 
posed a threat to more valuable U.S. and foreign 
satellites. But a successful intercept might generate 
debris and increase the long-term risk to spacecraft. 
Collision avoidance schemes based on other tech-
nologies developed for antisatellite or ballistic 
missile defense applications have been proposed; 
some would not generate debris.34 
32These were described above in the section on lightsats. Brilliant Pebbles would weigh tens of kilogram~ore than the lightest microspacecraft, 
and more than some lightsats, but still light enough to be launched by laser-powered rocket. 
33 A laser could be used to maneuver satellites much heavier than those it could launch into orbit. 
340TA has just begun an assessment of technologies for controlling space debris and protecting satellites from it. The assessment was requested by 
the Senate Comminee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, its Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, and the House Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology. 
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